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26 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

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BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
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Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)  
APO San Francisco 96490

AVDAGG

13 June 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

THRU: Channels

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D.C. 20310

Section I:

1. Operations

A. General: Following the completion of a major deployment of the 1 ACD from BINH DINH Province and Southern I Corps Tactical Zone in late January, this reporting period covers the initiation of high intensity combat operations in QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Provinces. It encompasses three highly successful and tactically significant operations: (1) The TET Offensive, which saw the 1 ACD preventing the seizure of QUANG TRI and assisting in the expulsion of the NVA from their foothold in Hue City (Operation Jeb Stuart I); (2) Operation PEGASUS/LAM SON 207A which relieved the NVA pressure on the 26th Marine Regiment at KHE SANH; and (3) the entirely air-supported Operation DELAWARE/LAM SON 216, which disrupted NVA activities by means of a reconnaissance in force in the A SHAU Valley. In each of these operations, the applied concepts, tactics, and doctrine of the 1 ACD were again proved successful. Cordon and search in conjunction with "Swooper" operations, initiated and refined on the BONG SON Plain, were again successful in disrupting the enemy infrastructure in NICTZ; and assisted in denying the enemy refuge among the populace. In Operation Pegasus, entire battalions were airlifted over enemy strong points and assaulted on to critical terrain astride the enemy's route of withdrawal. This bold move with its corresponding use of firepower had a profound effect on the enemy's will to stand and fight. In many cases he left his fortified delaying position, abandoning large amounts of supplies and equipment, and fled in small groups to the safety of Laos or to rugged uncontested terrain.

At the opposite end of the spectrum of mobility was the ground attack to relieve Hue. Using tactics more akin to breaching the SIEGFRIED LINE than to bold, dashing Cavalry charges, elements of the division attacked a strong, heavily bunkered enemy in weather that oft times precluded effective air and artillery support. The A SHAU Valley Operation was air-mobility in its finest hour. A dashing assault into an enemy bastion long denied to US Forces and against modern anti-aircraft defenses enabled the 1 ACD, entirely supported by air, to roam the valley at will for a period of almost 30 days.

During these operations, the 1 ACD demonstrated a considerable flexibility of a particular mission, the task organization of the 1 ACD expanded

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and contracted at various times during the reporting period. At its peak, during Operation PEGASUS (The relief of Khe Sanh Combat Base), the Division controlled the operations of 20 infantry battalions plus their normal artillery, air and other supporting elements. This was a World War II Corps sized force.

During the reporting period, Operation JEB STUART was officially terminated at 2400H 31 March 1968. The final results were:

(1) Friendly: 291 KIA, 1735 WIA, 24 MIA, 26 AC lost.

(2) Enemy: 3269 KIA, 119 PW, 585 FWC, 148 CSVC, 1314 Mine/HG, 76,837 SA ammo, 2906 lg cal rds, 89 tons rice.

Operation PEGASUS/LAM SON 207A began at 0001H 1 April 1968 and terminated at 0800H 15 April 1968. The final results were:

(1) Friendly: US Army: 41 KIA, 208 WIA, 5 MIA; USMC: 51 KIA, 459 WIA, 0 MIA; ARVN TF: 33 KIA, 187 WIA.

(2) Enemy: 1044 KIA, 9 PW's, 539 FWC, 184 CSVC, 12,046 lg cal rds, 9527 mines HG's, 261,750 SA ammo, 3,075 tons rice.

Operation DELAWARE commenced on 19 April with AA of elements of the 3d Bde into the Northern A Shau Valley. The operation continues into the next reporting period.

B. 1st Brigade: At the beginning of the reporting period, the Brigade was oriented towards the Ba Long Valley and enemy Base Area 101. However, with the NVA threatening QUANG TRI CITY, the brigade had to rapidly redirect its effort in that direction. By the end of the first week in February, the Brigade had redeployed forces to Quang Tri, defeated the enemy force battling in the outskirts of the city, seized the initiative in the area from the enemy, and commenced pursuit operations. (See TAB A: The Battle of Quang Tri). After the Battle of Quang Tri, the Brigade pursued the enemy throughout the coastal plains, Ba Long Valley, Base Area 101 and the area north of the TACH HAN River. Special emphasis was placed on joint operations with local ARVN forces. Operations were cordon and search, swooper, and hunter-killer. Psychological warfare and civil affairs teams were habitually used to support operations in populated areas. During daylight hours, search and clear operations were conducted throughout the AO to locate the enemy and capture or destroy him. At night, the Brigade used hunter-killer teams and night ambushes to seek out the enemy and to interdict his movement on trails and waterways.

On 5 April, two battalions air assaulted (one from vic Quang Tri, and one from LZ Stud to which it had been airlifted during the assault of the first battalion) into the PEGASUS/LAM SON 207A AO. The Brigade CP was established southwest of Khe Sanh at LZ Snapper and the battalions conducted immediate and aggressive combat operations against moderate enemy resistance. One battalion remained in the vicinity of Quang Tri and conducted offensive operations vicinity the Southwestern approaches to the city in order to secure 1 ACD helicopter assets langered at LZ Sharon. On 14 April, the Brigade CP and two battalions began their withdrawal from the Khe Sanh area and by 15 April, the entire Brigade was operational in the vicinity of Quang Tri City. For the next nine days, the Brigade conducted operations in the vicinity of Quang Tri and prepared for future operations. On 24 April, the Brigade began a reconnaissance in force in the A Shau Valley with one battalion conducting an air assault into the A Shau Valley and establishing a battalion fire base at LZ Cecile, west of A Luoi. On 25 April, a second battalion of the Brigade air assaulted into A Luoi where LZ STALLION was established. The third battalion and the brigade CP were then airlifted into LZ STALLION.

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During the remainder of the reporting period, the Brigade conducted reconnaissance in force operations uncovering many enemy logistical complexes.

C. 2d Brigade: Until 29 February 1968, the Brigade conducted operations in the PERSHING II AO, OPCON to IFFV. (See Incl B, Combat Operations After Action Report-Operation PERSHING II). On 1 March, the Brigade established a CP at LZ Jane and initiated operations with three battalions in the Jeb Stuart AO. This marked the first time the 1 ACD controlled all its organic units since July 1966. Throughout the remainder of Operation Jeb Stuart I, the Brigade conducted operations in Base Area 101, on the coastal plain vicinity of "The Street Without Joy", and along Sky King Avenue, leading from HAI LANG to the Gulf of Tonkin. Of principal concern was the security of Munder Beach (an over-the-beach logistical facility). Sky King Avenue and QL-1 in sector. Operations on the plains were characterized by cordon and search and sweep operations in order to attempt to deny the enemy refuge in populated areas. Several combined operations with local RVN forces assisted in initiating the destruction of the local VC infrastructure. Search and clear operations penetrated Base Area 101, and light resistance was met. On 3 April the Brigade conducted two battalion air assaults and one battalion airlift into an area Southeast of Khe Sanh. On 14 April the Bde with two battalions assumed the responsibility for the security of Khe Sanh and on 150800H April 1968 was released OPCON 1 ACD and placed OPCON 3d Marine Division. One battalion had airlifted to Camp Evans on 12 April. For the remainder of the reporting period, the Bde remained OPCON to the 3d Marine Division.

D. 3d Brigade: During the first month of the reporting period, the Brigade participated in the battle of Hue City. Many significant problems were encountered during the battle: poor weather, which hampered air-mobile operations and close air support, a shortage of supplies, all coupled with the appearance of a determined professional enemy. Although plagued by low ceilings, poor visibility, and fierce enemy resistance, the Bde drove the determined NVA forces from their well prepared/fortified defensive positions and battled its way to the walls of the former imperial capitol (See TJS C: The Battle of Hue). With the conclusion of the Battle of Hue, the emphasis of combat operations shifted to the coastal plains Northeast of Camp Evans and Base Area 114 Southwest of Camp Evans. Offensive operations on the coastal plains were in pursuit of a badly beaten enemy and in search of enemy caches and mortar/rocket locations. During this period, the Brigade launched the first US ground offensive into Base Area 114, in months. Against only light resistance, the Brigade conducted operations to the heart of the area; however, due to the initiation of Operation Pegasus/Lam Son 207A, it was not able to fully exploit the penetration. On 1 April the Brigade initiated operations in the PEGASUS/LAM SON 207A area of operations, by a series of air assaults/airlifts to the east of Khe Sanh Combat Base. The Brigade staged vicinity of Quang Tri City with one battalion assaulting from that area while the other two were deployed forward to LZ STUB from where they were air assaulted/landed into the AO. Against moderate resistance, the Brigade conducted operations destroying NVA forces East of Khe Sanh and opening Highway 9 to Khe Sanh. On 8 April, ground elements of the Brigade reached Khe Sanh Combat Base and assumed the security mission thereof. On 14 April the Brigade was airlifted from Khe Sanh to Camp Evans where it commenced preparations for future operations in the A Shau Valley. On 19 April the Brigade initiated operation Delaware/Lam Son 216 with two battalions air assaulting into the northern portion of the A Shau Valley. The

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initial entry was characterized by determined, accurate and multi-caliber anti-aircraft fire coupled with extremely marginal flying weather. Only by 23 April was the Brigade closed into the valley compared with the 4 plus hours required to close in Operation PEGASUS. For the remainder of the reporting period the Brigade conducted reconnaissance in force operations in the northern portion of the A Shau Valley and uncovered major NVA logistical and combat support complexes. Weather during PEGASUS precluded high intensity airmobile operations prior to 1200 hours whereas in DELAWARE, operations were normally precluded after 1200 hours.

E. 1st Brigade, 101 Abn: During the period 1 thru 18 March, the Brigade conducted combat operations to the Southwest of Hue along Highway 547. As the Brigade established fire bases from East to West in the vicinity of Highway 547, aggressive operations were conducted to destroy enemy forces in sector. Against moderate enemy resistance, the Brigade began to successfully neutralize enemy forces. Saturation patrolling and night ambushes were extremely successful. On 18 March the Brigade was returned OPCON to the 101st Abn Division.

F. 2d Brigade, 101 Abn: During the period 1 February to 10 March, the Brigade conducted operations on the coastal plain vicinity of "The Street Without Joy" and along Sky King Avenue. Of principle concern was the security of the developing over-the-beach logistical base at Wunder Beach, and the Sky King Avenue/QL-1 land LOC. Cordon and search operations in conjunction with the National Police Field Forces again proved successful as this brigade employed this 1 ACD technique. Continuous daylight patrols and night ambushes were required along QL-1 to reduce mining incidents. On 2 March the Brigade assumed the responsibility for the southern portion of the Jeb Stuart I AO and moved from the vicinity of LZ Jane and Hai Lam to the area between Hue and the An Lao bridge to facilitate return to its parent division. In the new Brigade AO, operations were directed toward the establishment of fire bases and the conduct of search and clear operations in the populated areas north of Hue. On 10 March the Brigade returned OPCON to the 101st Abn Division.

G. 1st Marine Regiment: During the period 29 March to 15 April, the Regiment conducted operations in the Pegasus/Lam Son 207A area of operations under the operational control of the 1 ACD. On 1 April the Regiment with two battalions launched an attack along the highground to the West from Ca Lu along Highway 9. One battalion operated in an AO vicinity of LZ STUB. The Regimental mission was to attack in zone destroying or capturing enemy forces and securing and assisting engineers in the reopening of Highway 9 in sector. To accomplish the mission the Regiment conducted a number of limited objective attacks against light enemy resistance. Operations were initially concentrated along Highway 9; however, as the situation developed the Regiment conducted operations several thousand meters to the North and South of Highway 9 using modified airmobile techniques. Only minimum security forces were required to protect the road and engineer work parties on QL-9. On 15 April the Regiment returned OPCON to the 3d Marine Division.

H. 26th Marine Regiment: During the period 31 March to 15 April, the Regiment, freed from its static positions in and near Khe Sanh by the 1 ACD, began operations under the operational control of the 1 ACD. As the 1 ACD advanced toward Khe Sanh by leaps and bounds, enemy activity around the besieged combat base ceased. Indirect fire attacks diminished and virtually disappeared and enemy ground troops fled from the battle field. Thus, the Marines were able to leave their fortified positions and attack the hills to

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the North, West and South, held previously by the enemy. Only moderate resistance was encountered and the Regiment was returned OPCON to the 3d Marine Division 15 April.

I. III ARVN ABN TASK FORCE: On 7 April, in cooperation and coordination with the 1 ACD, the III ARVN ABN TF initiated joint operations in the Pegasus/Lam Son 207A area of operations. To the southwest of Khe Sanh, the TF conducted a battalion size air assault and two battalion size airlifts to LZ Snake (XD808378). During the report period, the TF conducted a series of limited objective attacks against moderate resistance West to the Laos border. On 15 April the TF terminated operations in the Pegasus/Lam Son 207A area of operations.

J. 3d ARVN Regiment: On 29 and 30 April two battalions of the Regiment airlifted to LZ Lucy vic Ta Bat in the central A Shau Valley. The 2d Bn 1st ARVN Regiment, attached, was to follow on 1 May. Here they initiated a joint reconnaissance in force operation in cooperation and coordination with the 1 ACD. The operation continues into the next reporting period.

K. 196th Light Infantry Brigade: On 20 April the Brigade arrived at Camp Evans and was placed OPCON to the 1 ACD. Given the mission to secure Camp Evans and conduct combat operations in the vicinity, the Brigade utilized 1 ACD aviation assets to accomplish the required tasks. Areas of principal concern were the security of CL-1 in sector, and the rocket belt vicinity of LZ Jack. Extensive operations were conducted against sporadic light resistance to the South-west of Camp Evans while numerous patrols, night ambushes, and reinforced bridge security positions discouraged enemy attempts to interdict CL-1 in sector.

L. 1-9 Cavalry: During the report period, the Squadron continued to conduct reconnaissance of the Division area of operations and to provide support to the Brigades on a mission basis. Initially, C Troop was assigned the Northern portion of the AO and B Troop was assigned the Southern portion. As a rule, C Troop supported the 1st Bde and 2d Bde 101 Abn, while B Troop supported the 3d Bde. D Troop provided convoy security on CL-1 between Quang Tri and Camp Evans. On 17 Feb A Troop departed the Pershing II AO and joined the Squadron in the Jeb Stuart I AO. This marked the first time the Squadron had operated with all organic resources since 5 April 1967. During the remainder of the report period, the concept of operations assumed the familiar role of one troop in General Support of each brigade. The Squadron continued to conduct intensive first and last light reconnaissance around Camp Evans, LZ Sharon, LZ Jang, and the Murder Beach Complex. Except for special operations, emphasis of reconnaissance was directed in base areas 101 and 114, Ba Long Valley, and on the Coastal Plains. In the month of April, the first half of the month saw the Squadron conducting extensive operations around the Khe Sanh Combat Base in Operation Pegasus/Lam Son 207A. Due to a total lack of tactical intelligence concerning the area in and around Khe Sanh, the 1-9 Cav commenced reconnaissance operations on 26 March vic of LZ STUD and ultimately extending west of Khe Sanh to acquire hard intelligence and to destroy enemy forces, anti-aircraft positions, and resources with artillery, tactical air, and B-52 arc light strikes. The combination of 1-9 Cav recon resources working with massive fire support assets provided a classic example of fire and maneuver once the 1 ACD maneuver battalions were integrated into the operation on 1 April. When the operation came to a close on 15 April, the Squadron initiated extensive reconnaissance in the A Shau Valley in Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216 in the same manner as in Operation Pegasus.



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M. Combat Support Elements:

(1) Division Artillery submitted by separate report.  
 (2) 11th Aviation Group: Headquarters, 11th Aviation Group operated from Camp Evans until 30 March 1968, and then displaced to LZ Stud in support of Operation Pegasus. On 15 April the CP returned from LZ Stud to Camp Evans. Significant operations in which the 11th Aviation Group participated were:

(A) JEB STUART I (1 February-31 March):

(1) During February, priority of aviation support went to the 3d Brigade during the Battle of Hue. 3d Brigade elements were in moderate to heavy contact throughout the month. Aviation support was severely hampered by extremely adverse weather. This was further aggravated by hostile fire, mortar/rocket attacks and a low availability of mission ready aircraft. Lightning Bug missions were conducted nightly along Highway CL-1 to reduce mining incidents and NVA movement along the road.

(2) As the weather improved and the Battle of Hue ended in the first part of March, the number of combat assaults increased throughout the AO. When the 2d Brigade displaced from the Pershing AO, four HRFs were required on a daily basis (one to each of the divisional brigades and one to the 2d Bde, 101st Airborne Division). Aviation assets were deployed in depth throughout the AO to disperse resources and to insure maximum responsiveness for the supported units. Numerous emergency resupply missions were required. One resupply conducted for the 1st ARVN Division in the vicinity of Quang Tri (YD344629) resulted in 28 NVA KIA by D/229th gunships. On several occasions during the month, the stand-by flare ship was requested by units in contact. Weather conditions precluded VFR flights; consequently, the aircraft was given a GCA vector to the site of the engagement. After contact was established with the ground commander, flares were released and then adjusted by the ground unit. On 22 March the 229th A-1H executed a CA with simultaneous touch downs of three 6 + 2 flights southeast of Quang Tri around an enemy complex. Throughout March, planning was in progress for Operation Pegasus. The quartering party closed at LZ Stud (XD 011483) on 24 March and the tactical CP closed on 30 March.

(B) PEGASUS (1-15 April):

(1) Pre-Assault: On 24 March the quartering party moved to LZ Stud and began work on command and communications bunkers. Reconnaissance of the area and proposed LZ sites were conducted by commanders and flight leaders. The assault elements of the 3d Brigade were pre-positioned at LZ Pedro. On 30 March the 11th Aviation Group moved to LZ Stud and operation control was transferred from Camp Evans on 31 March.

(2) Initial Assault: D Day commenced on 1 April with the 3d Brigade air assaulting and airlifting into the Pegasus AO, while the 1st Marine Regiment attacked with 2 battalions west from Ca Lu along highway 9. One battalion of the 3d Brigade air assaulted and a second battalion airlifted to LZ MIKE. The third battalion of the Brigade air assaulted into LZ CATES (XD 932432). On 2 April (D+1) the battalion which was previously airlifted to LZ MIKE air assaulted to (XD 898403) and established LZ THOR. The 2d Brigade, on 3 April, (D+2), air assaulted one battalion and airlifted one battalion into LZ WHARTON (XD 878363) while the third battalion of the Brigade air assaulted into LZ TOM (XD 898342). On 5 April (D+4), the 1st Brigade air assaulted one battalion and airlifted a second battalion into LZ SNAFFER (XD 844347). The ARVN Airborne Task Force assaulted/airlifted into LZ SNAKE (XD 810378) on 7 April (D+6).

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(3) Extraction: The 1st and 3d Brigades of the 1ACD and the ARVN Airborne Brigade began withdrawing from the Pegasus AG on 11 April. This extraction was conducted by a combination of Air Force Aircraft using the Khe Sanh and LZ Stud airstrips, organic aircraft, and vehicle convoy. The main command element of the 11th Aviation Group displaced to Camp Evans on 14 April. The rear operations element ceased operations at LZ Stud on 15 April.

(4) Communications: During preliminary planning for this operation it was readily apparent that serious communications problems would be encountered. LZ Stud was sited in a bowl shaped mountainous area located 54 kilometers from Camp Evans. A relay site was established on Hill 440, just west of Stud; however reliability problems persisted. Equipment shortcomings reduced the effectiveness of the AM voice/RTT net. In all probability this system would have provided effective and reliable communications if the AM equipment had been operating.

(C) JEB STUART II (16-18 April): Routine support was provided to the Division during this period. In addition, support was provided to the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, OPCON to the 1st ACD. This period was utilized to improve aircraft availability and plan for Operation Delaware.

(3) 13th Signal Battalion: During the reporting period, the 13th Signal Battalion provided communications to the Division Task Organization for:

- (a) Operation Pershing II: 1-29 Feb (RUM DIEM Province)
- (b) Operation Jeb Stuart I: 1 Feb-30 Mar
- (c) Operation Pegasus/Lam Son 207A: 31 Mar-15 Apr
- (d) Operation Jeb Stuart II: 16-18 Apr
- (e) Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216

During the month of February, the Battalion continued to provide communications support for the 1 ACD in operations Pershing II and Jeb Stuart I. Direct communications were maintained with the 2d Brigade at LZ Uplift and the 1st Provisional Battalion at Camp Radcliff using AM radio. Motor messenger service was also provided to the Div AG at Camp Radcliff. An Air Signal Courier made daily runs between An Khe and Phu Bai via C-7A Aircraft. At the Division CP (Camp Evans), the following services were provided:

- (1) FM Radio (Secure and non-secure)
- (2) AM Radio (Voice and secure teletype)
- (3) Telephone switching system
- (4) Communication Center (Secure teletype)
- (5) Motor messenger service

Although communications commitments continued throughout the month, there were no serious difficulties encountered.

During the month of March, plans were finalized for Operation Pegasus/Lam Son 207A. A Sub-area signal center was deployed to Camp Evans to provide telephone service at that location. The deployment of Signal equipment for Operation Pegasus presented major difficulties. The location of the Division CP at LZ Stud, and surrounding terrain required the use of a relay site, Hill 440, to the west. The relay site was secured by ground forces on 26 March, but enemy contact precluded night operation until 29 March. Additionally the site required extensive earth work prior to emplacement of signal equipment. Provisional Corps signal equipment was moved to the hill by Division aviation assets. After installing Corps Tropo and VHF systems on the hill, extreme difficulty was experienced in establishing the Corps circuits. Major items of equipment failed (TRC-97 transmitter and

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generators) and inexperienced operators on the Corps VHF systems could not establish the required circuits. At the request of the Division Signal Officer, more experienced Corps personnel were flown in to get the circuits established. This effort on Corps systems took supervisory effort away from the divisional systems. In spite of these difficulties, the Division CP had switchboard service, radio circuits and VHF systems to the Brigades/Regiments prior to the Division CP displacement from Camp Evans. Even after displacement, Corps teletype circuits and TDC hot lines had not been established. Work continued on these circuits and satisfactory service was received four days after the Division CP had displaced.

Operation Delaware began with the establishment of an FM radio and a VHF relay site on "Signal Mountain" (Hill 1487). Long Range Patrol, engineers and signal personnel were inserted on the hill top to secure a communications radio relay site for the operation. Non-flyable weather delayed operations for two days. Once the site was secured and cleared, relay communications for the Division TAC CP were installed. Difficulties were encountered in airlifting communications equipment to the relay site throughout the period due to non-flyable weather. A qualified pathfinder was assigned to control air traffic on the third day of operations. The relay site was also used as a weather station and artillery fire base. Communications personnel were employed throughout the period in assisting infantry units in defense of the area.

Six automatic FM radio-retransmissions sets and two VHF radio relay set were installed on the site to maintain FM radio and telephone communications between units operating in the A Shau Valley and LZ Evans.

On 29 April 1968, a Division TAC CP was established at LZ Stallion. No serious difficulties were encountered during this move. The following communications were installed:

(1) FM radio (secure and non-secure) to all major subordinate commands.

(2) AM radio (voice and secure teletype) to all major subordinate commands.

(3) VHF radio telephone communications to the two committed Brigades, 3d ARVN Regt and LZ Evans.

(4) Switchboard and telephone service at LZ Stallion.

(4) 8th Engineer Battalion: During the reporting period the tactical operations in the Jeb Stuart AO. In the latter stages of this quarter, Operations Pegasus (1-15 April 1968 and Delaware (19 April to the present) increased the tactical scope, causing a similar increase in engineer support. Initially, all available resources were committed in support of OL-1, developing new landing zones and fire bases, and preparing installations in the new AO. Elements that had remained in the Pershing AO to support the 2d Brigade returned to the battalion in late February. Extensive work was done on major LZ's to develop helicopter landing, refuel, and rearm facilities without detracting from the direct support provided to the maneuver battalions engaged in tactical operations. Construction was initiated on three airstrips during the reporting period. At Camp Evans, a 150'x3100' strip was completed by mid April for C-130 aircraft, with work still in progress on a parking apron. At LZ Stud, a 150'x2500' strip was built to support Operation Pegasus (1-15 April) and at LZ Stallion, a strip presently being constructed in support of Operation Delaware (19 April-present). Elements of Mobile Construction Battalions 4, 5 and 10 provided engineering support to the 1st Air Cavalry Division throughout the reporting period.

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being joined by the 11th Engineer Battalion (USMC) during Operation Pegasus. In addition, the 14th Engineer Battalion, 45th Engineer Group, has initiated operations in support of the Division by daily mine sweeps and the placement of D Company in direct support of Division elements at Camp Evans.

2. Discussion and Analysis of Major Operations: Operation JEB STUART I (17 Jan-31 Mar 1968); Operation PEGASUS/LAM SON 207A (1-15 April 1968); Operation DELAWARE/LAM SON 216 (19 April-continuing) (for task organizations see TAB D).

A. JEB STUART I.

(1) General: TOE, attached, and supporting units of the 1 ACD conducted combat operations in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces during Operation JEB STUART I. The enemy TET offensive was conducted during Operation JEB STUART I and consequently the Division was engaged in heavy contact on numerous occasions. The Battle of Hue, which lasted the entire month of February (See TAB C), was one of the two very significant contacts in the JEB STUART AO. Results of the battle were 404 enemy KIA, 15 captured, and 187 weapons captured or destroyed. The other significant contact was the Battle of Quang Tri (See TAB A). In contrast to the Battle of Hue, the Battle of Quang Tri lasted only seven days. Results of the battle were 900 enemy KIA, 300 weapons captured or destroyed with the City of Quang Tri never being occupied by the enemy. The month of February was a critical period of the war in the First Corps Tactical Zone. The enemy launched what he believed to be an offensive capable of an easy victory, whereas in reality he met defeat. One major item which attributed to the enemy's defeat was his lack of understanding and appreciation of the 1 ACD's flexibility, mobility and firepower—a unit whose presence in ICTZ he had certainly not anticipated.

With the conclusion of the enemy TET offensive, there was a significant decline in enemy contacts. During the reporting period, the enemy was attempting to regroup his fighting posture while avoiding detection or actual contact with the forces of the First Team. In order to deny respite to the enemy, the 1 ACD quickly initiated pursuit operations following the enemy on the coastal plain and deep into known enemy base areas. During the month of March, the 1 ACD penetrated Base Area 101 with 99 reconnaissance missions and 77 offensive operations. Base Area 114 was penetrated by 48 reconnaissance missions and 14 offensive operations.

(2) Other significant actions occurring in the JEB STUART I AO were:

(a) On 2 February, an aircraft from B Troop, 1-9 Cav, in support of the 3d Brigade in the vicinity of Hue, became the target of intense ground-to-air fire. The aircraft was hit and crash-landed in enemy controlled territory. The crew escaped serious injury, but was immediately engaged by small arms fire. While the crew was being extracted by a Marine helicopter (CH-46), scout aircraft engaged the enemy resulting in 15 KIA's. In scattered contacts throughout the remainder of the day, the troops killed an additional 20 enemy resulting in a total of 35 enemy KIA for the day.

(b) On 7 February, aircraft of C Troop, 1-9 Cav, while performing first light reconnaissance around Dong Ha, observed a well fortified area at coordinate YD 194610. The area was engaged resulting in 12 NVA KIA. Exploiting the area of contact, C Troop 1-9 Cav continued to develop the situation and in scattered contact in the vicinity of YD 200621, the troop engaged and killed another 41 NVA.

(c) On 16-17 Feb, A/1-9 Cav and B/1-8 Cav engaged in heavy contact with elements of the 803d Regt, 324B Division vicinity YD 433403.

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Results of the engagement were 29 NVA KIA and 4 AK-47, 2 SKS Captured, and 1 RPG destroyed. Friendly losses were 9 KIA, 5 WIA from 1-8 Cav and 2 KIA from 2-20 Arty. At 161400H February, A/1-8 Cav and B/1-8 Cav were combat assaulted vic YD 433608 to conduct search and clear operations to the Northwest. As soon as the ground elements deployed, the scout team working with B/1-8 Cav received S/A fire northwest of the companies' locations. ARA received extensive ground fire from this same location resulting in 2 US KIA. Arty and air strikes were employed against the enemy and these were followed by a ground attack. Both companies continued to meet heavy resistance and at 1900H withdrew into a mutually supporting night FOB. Artillery was fired into the contact area all night long and the following morning an artillery TOT was fired followed by employment of CS, followed by a ground attack. TAC air could not be employed on 17 February due to marginal weather conditions.

(d) On 18 February 1968, at 0107H, vicinity YD 392544, C/1-8 Cav while in a night perimeter was attacked by the 5th Company, 603d Regt, 324B Div. An OP observed 40 individuals moving toward the perimeter. The OP was withdrawn and the enemy was engaged with artillery. At the same time the perimeter came under 60mm mortar, B-40 rocket, and small arms fire. At 0145H a UH-1H flareship came on station. At 0215H the fire ceased and an emergency resupply ship was brought in which drew enemy fire. A medevac ship took out 4 WIA at 0235H. At 0245H the perimeter again came under sporadic mortar and small arms fire. Artillery engaged a suspected target at YD 391550. At 0220H Moonshine (USAF C-47 flareship) replaced the UH-1H flareship. All firing ceased at 0350H. At 0415H, a 2d Moonshine came on station. At first light a check of the area revealed 6 NVA KIA, 6 AK-47, numerous drag marks (body), and 3" of documents. Friendly casualties were 4 US KIA and 4 US WIA. During the day the unit found 2 more NVA KIA and 5 B-40 rockets, 150 rounds of S/A ammo, 19 Chicom grenades, 26 AK-47 magazines, 1 carbine magazine, and assorted NVA equipment.

(e) On 19 February at 1530H, in a combined search and clear operation vicinity YD 363610, A/1-12 and C/1-12 Cav came into heavy contact with an estimated NVA Company. After initial contact was established the units pulled back and artillery was fired into the contact area. TAC air could not be employed due to marginal weather conditions in the target area. Both companies continued the attack through the area killing 8 NVA. ARA ships engaged several groups of enemy in hedgerows who were trying to evade the contact area and accounted for 38 NVA KIA and destroyed 3 light machine guns.

(f) On 22 February at 1500H vicinity YD 315505 A & C/1-3 Marines, acting in response to a report from the Senior Sector Advisor of Quang Tri, conducted a cordon and search operation with a PRU team, resulting in the capture of 5 hamlet cadre and 17 hamlet guerrillas.

(g) At 1303H on 24 February vicinity YD 362594 first brigade scouts in support of B1-12 Cav killed 11 NVA and captured 2 9mm pistols, 1 PPS-43 SMG, assorted web gear, and Chicom grenades.

(h) On 1 March, 1-501 Abn made contact with an unknown size enemy force north of the An Lac Bridge on the Song Bo River. Sixteen NVA were killed by the airborne troopers who were supported by ARA, tube artillery, 1-9 Cav gunships and tactical air strikes.

(i) On 2 March, 1-7 Cav made contact with an unknown size enemy force vic YD 6211, killing 12 NVA and capturing two pistols and two rifles.

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(j) On 10 March, a last light recon team from 1-9 Cav working in the foothills near Base Area 114 spotted an advance party of a possible regimental size unit on a well used trail. The NVA soldiers were immediately taken under fire and the area was marked by smoke. An AH-1G (Cobra) was sent to the area in support of the recon team. After 20 minutes of aerial rocket and machine gun fire from the three ships, 32 NVA soldiers were killed. Although late in the day, a decision was made to insert an infantry platoon of 1-9 Cav to exploit the action. While on the ground, the infantry captured 3 weapons and one pack. Movement was detected around them, and to keep from being decisively engaged, they were extracted without incident. The recon team covering the extraction killed 7 more NVA.

(k) On 13 March, C/2-7 Cav in a village at YD 558473 killed 5 NVA. The company received 60mm mortar fire with neg casualties. In the same area the company captured several tons of rice hidden in false graves.

(1) At 250900H Mar 68, A/1-8 Cav assaulted two separate LZ's: one on the south and one on the north of the hamlet of Thon Xuan Duong. Upon landing, both LZs were Green. At 0918H units on both LZs were receiving heavy fire from all directions. ARA and Brigade Scouts were on station and engaged the areas. The third platoon of D/1-8 Cav which had conducted a "Swooper" operation vic of YD 387558 earlier moved by foot to a position vic YD 399553. D (-)/1-8 Cav further south, attempted to move to the west to rejoin its sister units; however, intense SA, AW & B-40 rocket fire prevented this. Following the unsuccessful maneuver of D/1-8, A/1-8 and C/1-8 conducted coordinated attacks supported by A/1-9 Cav, artillery, ARA and CS to link up with the two platoons. The attempt failed because of intense enemy fire. Artillery, ARA, and gunships continued to engage the area. A/1-8 (-) and C/1-8 were resupplied by logships and established defensive positions in the center of a village. Contact remained sporadic until 1930H when it was broken. During the hours of darkness, illumination was provided by "Spooky" and by "Moonshine." The target area was engaged by artillery throughout the night. POW's captured earlier in the day indicated that the companies were in contact with the K-14 Main Force Bn minus its heavy weapons company. A search of the battle area the following morning revealed that the enemy had exfiltrated in small groups to the northeast. Results of the battle were: 276 NVA KIA, 6 small arms weapons and 1 LMG captured.

#### B. PEGASUS/LAM SON 207A

(1) General: Operation PEGASUS/LAM SON 207A will become a classic example of fire and maneuver combining artillery, tactical air and B-52 arc light strikes with a massive employment of troops using airmobile tactics and techniques. In the operation, the mission of the 1 ACD and its non-divisional units, was to relieve Khe Sanh Combat Base; re-open QL-9 from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh; and destroy enemy forces in the PEGASUS AO. To accomplish the mission, the 1 ACD was augmented by the following non-divisional units: 1st Marine Regiment, 26th Marine Regiment, III ARVN Airborne Task Force, and the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion. Although the enemy may have initiated a withdrawal of troops prior to Operation PEGASUS, it soon became evident he had no intention of allowing the combined force to march to Khe Sanh unopposed. He had established successive blocking positions, oriented toward the East, on critical terrain astride QL-9. Based on the organization of these delaying positions a conventional attack westward along QL-9 would not only have been costly in casualties, but would have taken a much longer period than 1 week to reach the desired objective, Khe Sanh.

On 14 March engineer construction began on a 150' x 2500' airstrip and a logistical complex at LZ STUD. By 29 March the strip was opened for C-7A

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traffic and by 7 April the strip was capable of receiving C-123 traffic.

On 26 March (D-6), 1-9 Cav supported by tube artillery from LZ STUP, TAC AIR, and responsive B-52 arc light strikes, commenced its reconnaissance efforts west of Ca Lu. As no tactical intelligence of value was available on the Khe Sanh area, 1-9 Cav had to acquire sufficient information on the enemy and the terrain in order for the tactical plan to be completed. In arcs of ever increasing distance west from Ca Lu and LZ STUP, 1-9 Cav pinpointed enemy concentrations and anti-aircraft sites and immediately brought to bear on these varied ordnance. By 1 April, sufficient intelligence concerning the enemy had been obtained, his anti-aircraft weapons neutralized, and the 1 ACD prepared to launch its massive helicopter assault. On 1 April, the 1 ACD commenced the attack toward Khe Sanh with the 1st Marine Regiment conducting a ground attack west from Ca Lu along QL-9 and the 3d Brigade, 1ACD, air assaulting two battalions and airlifting one battalion onto critical terrain behind the initial enemy delaying positions, about half way between Ca Lu and Khe Sanh Combat Base. On 3 April, the 2d Brigade, 1 ACD, air assaulted two battalions and airlifted one battalion to the Southeast of Khe Sanh and on 4 April one battalion of the 26th Marine Regiment emerged from its static defensive position and attacked and seized Hill 471, south of Khe Sanh Combat Base. On 5 April, the 1st Brigade, 1 ACD, air assaulted one battalion and airlifted a second battalion to the Southwest of Khe Sanh. On 7 April, the III ARVN ABN TF air assaulted one battalion and airlifted two battalions to the west of Khe Sanh near the Laotian border. The rapid employment of allied troops along the entire length of the enemy's line of communication/withdrawal had a devastating effect on his morale. In many instances, enemy forces left their well designed delaying positions abandoning large quantities of supplies and equipment, and attempting to evade back in to Laos or on to rugged, uncontested terrain. With the enemy on the run and the allies in hot pursuit, the enemy could retaliate only with indirect fire from Laos—the only offensive means available to him at the time. Although largely ineffective, the enemy launched repeated rocket/mortar/artillery attacks against many of the established allied fire bases. On 8 April sky troopers of the 1ACD were welcomed by the 26th Marine Regiment at the Khe Sanh Combat Base. On 12 April Highway 9 was opened from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh and by 15 April the operation was terminated. Part three of the 1 ACD mission had not been completed, but the importance of displacing the 1 ACD to the A Shau Valley overrode this consideration.

(2) Significant actions occurring in the PEGASUS/LAM SON 2071 area of operation were:

(a) On 4 April elements of the 26th Mar Regt attacked South from Khe Sanh Combat Base, seized Hill 471, and repulsed a determined NVA counter attack. Results were: 122 NVA KIA.

(b) On 5 April, A/1-9 Cav at XD 829344 and XD 824352 spotted and engaged NVA in fortified positions and in the open. Results: 53 NVA KIA.

(c) On 6 April as the 2-7 Cav continued to attack west along QL-9 toward Khe Sanh Combat Base, the battalion encountered numerous pockets of enemy resistance. Results of a continuous day of fighting were: 83 NVA KIA, 122 IWC, 10 CWC.

(d) On 7 thru 10 April, the 2-5 Cav conducted attacks in the vicinity of the old French Fort (XD 883382) against determined enemy resistance. Results were: 43 NVA KIA, 15 CSWC, 53 IWC.

(e) On 7 April, A/1-9 Cav XD 843345 spotted and engaged NVA troops both in the open and in fortified positions. Results were: 42 NVA KIA.

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(f) On 080400 April, elements of the III RVN ABN TP at LZ SNAKE came under a mortar and ground attack. Artillery, ARA and direct fires assisted in the defense of the LZ. At 06304 contact broke. Results were: 72 NVA KIA.

(g) On 10-11 April, elements A/1-9 Cav discovered a large ammo cache and a truck loaded with ammo and supplies. Air strikes were placed into the area. The next day, while conducting a BDA of the area, elements of A Troop observed armored vehicle tracks which led to the discovery of two well camouflaged tanks. The tanks were destroyed by airstrikes along with 15 NVA KIA.

(h) On 11 April, the 1-12 Cav attacking toward the Lang Vei Special Forces camp made contact with an enemy force of unknown size at YD 785357 resulting in 27 NVA KIA. The next day upon entering the Special Forces Camp the 1-12 Cav killed 13 more NVA and captured 11 CW and 10 JW.

C. DELAWARE/LAM SON 216.

(1) General: Operation DELAWARE/LAM SON 216 began on 19 April 1968. The operation was preceded as in Operation FETTER, by the employment of the 1-9 Cav in an intelligence acquisition role as tactical intelligence on the A Shau Valley was again conspicuous by its absence. Pin-pointing and destroying anti-aircraft weapons using artillery, tactical air, and A-1H light strikes was again modus operandi. At the end of three consecutive good flying weather days, sufficient intelligence had been acquired and anti-aircraft positions neutralized to initiate the operation. Based on intelligence provided by the 1-9 Cav, the initial assault was changed from vicinity A Luoi to the vicinity of the northwestern end of the valley. The operation was designed as a "Reconnaissance in force" directed against the enemy and his supply areas located in the A Shau Valley. For public information purposes, the operation was dubbed a "spoiling attack." Two battalions of the 3d Brigade air assaulted into the Northern portion of the A Shau Valley on 19 April. Hampered by extremely bad weather in the objective area, the entire Brigade was not closed until 23 April and this only after fantastic feats of airmanship under IFR conditions performed by the aviators of the 11th Avn Group, 1-9 Cav, 2-20 ARA and brigade aviation platoons. On 24 April one battalion of the 1st Brigade air assaulted into LZ CECILE vic A Luoi and by 25 April the entire Brigade was deployed in the central portion of the A Shau Valley. On 29 April one battalion of the 3d ARVN Regt airlifted to LZ LUCY, vic Ta Bat, and by the end of April the majority of the Regiment was conducting operations in the South/Central portion of the A Shau Valley. On 29 April the forward Division command post was established at A Luoi and by the end of the report period engineer reconstruction of the airfield at A Luoi was virtually complete.

(2) Significant Actions occurring in the DELAWARE/LAM SON 216 area of operation to date:

(a) The night of 17 April, 5-7 Cav observed what they reported to be a large convoy of 60-100 trucks near LZ Tiger. Artillery engaged resulting in a large secondary explosion.

(b) On 25 April, at YD 312075, A/1-7 Cav found three flat bed trucks and three 37mm anti-aircraft guns. The trucks and guns were all in working condition. 300 rds of ammo were present.

(c) On 26 April, near LZ Tiger, D/5-7 Cav engaged an estimated platoon size enemy force. There were 12 NVA KIA.

(d) On 30 April, near LZ Tiger, C/5-7 Cav found four 37mm anti-aircraft weapons with 500 rounds of ammunition. No enemy resistance was encountered.



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## Section II. Lessons Learned

### A. Personnel: None

### B. Operations.

#### (1) Use of CS.

(a) OBSERVATION: CS continuous to be an effective means to route and disorganize the enemy.

(b) EVALUATION: The use of CS against enemy positions can cause the enemy to leave making them a more vulnerable target to organic and artillery fires.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units employ CS at every opportunity, and have protective masks readily available.

#### (2) Enemy Mortar and Rocket Firing

(a) OBSERVATION: The enemy possess the capability to mortar and rocket friendly installations anywhere in the AO.

(b) EVALUATION: One of many methods for quickly locating these locations is to utilize the intersection method.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That every soldier be trained to be particularly alert for enemy mortar and rocket flashes. Upon sighting flashes, a soldier should immediately take an azimuth reading to the flash and render a report through his command channel.

#### (3) Armor Seats in LOH.

(a) OBSERVATION: There is a need for better armor seats in the OH-6A helicopter.

(b) EVALUATION: The armor seats in the LOH are designed so that there is approximately a 2 inch gap where the back seat and front seat junction. The chances of having a round come through this gap is remote; however, it has happened, resulting in serious injury to the pilot. The observer successfully landed the aircraft preventing a loss of crew and aircraft.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That armor seats be redesigned, closing the gap in the seat.

#### (4) Recovery Aircraft.

(a) OBSERVATION: In the past, it has been a common practice to have a flight leader responsible for all downed aircraft. Normally when a flight consisted of 12 or more aircraft, the battalion maintenance aircraft accompanied the flight.

(b) EVALUATION: These procedures have proven inadequate where there is intensive enemy activity and large flights of aircraft involved. When the flight consists of 12 or more UH-1's, a minimum of two recovery aircraft are necessary to extract downed crews (troops). Relieving the flight leader of this responsibility insures he can devote his full attention to his mission. The presence of recovery aircraft also enhances crew morale.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That two (or more depending on size of flight) recovery aircraft be assigned to any 12 UH-1 or larger flight.

#### (5) Supporting Fires for Log Aircraft

(a) OBSERVATION: During the Battle of Hue, log aircraft were continuously exposed to hostile fire while carrying supplies to the ground units. Numerous aircraft were hit and several shot down. Coordination was made with the supported unit for covering fires during the approach, unloading and departure of the log aircraft.

(b) EVALUATION: Supporting fires included representative weapons of all calibers to include artillery. Gun-target lines and flight

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routes were coordinated. The log aircraft called in his position at prescribed points and the fires were fired as appropriate. Screening smoke could also be used effectively to cover a mission.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this technique be publicized and used as required.

(6) CH-54 IFR Operations

(a) OBSERVATION: CH-54 sling loads must be properly secured during IFR operations.

(b) EVALUATION: The CH-54 is capable of carrying sling loads under IFR conditions; however, certain limitations are imposed in the interest of safety. Single point suspension loads are unsatisfactory; however, loads can be carried IFR with the four point hook-up by securing the load with aircraft hoist. In addition loads can be carried in the crane pod (maximum of 9,000 pounds) under IFR conditions.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That CH-54 sling loads be secured using the four point hook-up or by use of the crane pod during IFR operations.

(7) Dual Aircraft for Log Missions

(a) OBSERVATION: As a result of extensive hostile ground to air firing, single aircraft missions in and out of field positions should be avoided.

(b) EVALUATION: Flying log aircraft in pairs obviously requires additional planning and coordination by logistics control team at each battalion. However, when log aircraft fly dual missions, instant crew recovery can be accomplished in the event one of the aircraft goes down. Flight following is enhanced and simplified as the aircraft are mutually supporting.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That dual log ships be used when dictated by the tactical situation and as aircraft availability permits.

(8) Medevac at Night in Poor Weather

(a) OBSERVATION: Medevac by helicopter can be accomplished during periods of darkness and poor weather in cases of extreme emergency.

(b) EVALUATION: Techniques were developed during the reporting period to conduct medevac at night during periods of poor weather in cases of extreme life or death emergencies. Search lights are utilized and a line of constant artillery illumination is fired to the vicinity of the PZ. At the PZ ground illumination is utilized to guide the medevac helicopter on its last leg. Artillery illumination continues in a line to guide the helicopter back to its own pad where rotating beacons are used to guide the returning helicopter.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this technique be utilized when applicable.

(9) Mine Sweep Procedures

(a) OBSERVATION: Many units establish a procedure for mine sweeps and then never deviate from it.

(b) EVALUATION: This action has the advantage of assuring the commander a thorough, well controlled sweep. However, it also gives the enemy the advantage of being able to predict movements. He is then able to place his mines and booby traps to inflict maximum damage.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units engaged in daily mine sweeps alter their methods of sweeping from different directions and on a non-scheduled basis.

(10) Command Detonated Mines

(a) OBSERVATION: In Northern I Corps Zone, the enemy is employing numerous command detonated mines in conjunction with conventional mine warfare.

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(b) EVALUATION: Command detonated mines render considerable damage to mine sweep teams. On more than one occasion, individuals of sweep teams who have discovered a mine and are about to uncover it have literally been blown to pieces by command detonated mines.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the security element work at least 100 meters to either flank and forward of the sweep team and execute a vigorous search for the enemy while one man is placed in either ditch with a grappling hook dragged behind him on the ground.

(11) Spot Mine Sweeps

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of engineer troops in the lead vehicle of a convoy to provide a spot mine sweep has proved quite effective.

(b) EVALUATION: This method of mine sweep can be used by a tactical commander over routes normally traveled by friendly troops but accessible to the enemy during periods of darkness. However, if the speed of the convoy is in excess of 10mph, the spot mine sweep loses its effectiveness and cannot provide the desired safety to the convoy.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The tactical commander be informed of the spot mine sweep concept.

(12) Hasty Repair of Runway Soft Spots

(a) OBSERVATION: Quick repair of small portions of forward airfields supporting a limited tactical operation is a necessity.

(b) EVALUATION: The backhoe, model 3414 can be effectively used to scoop out centralized soft spots that do not meet the bearing requirements established under MACV criteria. By replacing the poor material with river run or a suitable substitute, the danger area can be quickly erased.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the 3414 backhoe be included in the initial lift of equipment for rehabilitation of existing airfields.

C. Training

Sling Out for Engineer Equipment

(a) OBSERVATION: During Operation PEGASUS and DELAWARE, it became evident that personnel were not proficient in breakdown and rigging for sling out of all types of airmobile equipment.

(b) EVALUATION: These operations emphasized the need for constant training of personnel in all aspects of sling out.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units conduct training of all personnel in proper sling out techniques and that riggers from the 15th SAS Bn present training as necessary to each unit within the 1st Air Cavalry Division.

D. Intelligence

(1) Overt Liaison Contact (CI)

(a) OBSERVATION: An effective liaison program between intelligence agencies is required.

(b) EVALUATION: By positioning personnel in large cities in areas within the Division AO, and in those cities in the Division TAOI where there are a number of allied intelligence agencies, an effective liaison program has been established, which has resulted in the effective and timely transmission of intelligence information from numerous sources not previously available. This is particularly noticeable in the areas of Quang Tri and Hue.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The practice of establishing permanent liaison teams should be incorporated in the intelligence program.

(2) Translations by ARVN Interpreters

(a) OBSERVATION: A Requirement exists to insure accurate translation of intelligence documents. 16

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(b) EVALUATION: Because of the language barrier existing between US and SVN personnel, interpreters are assigned to the CI Section, 191st MID. Their duties frequently require them to translate intelligence reports from SVN agencies. Because there is no way for US personnel to determine the completeness of the translation, the document, after being translated by one interpreter, is given to a second, who has no knowledge that the document has been previously translated. By comparing the two translations, a better assessment of the completeness of the translation can be made.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this double check system be SOP in translation of intelligence data where SVN personnel serve as interpreters.

(3) Processing Wounded Prisoners

(a) OBSERVATION: Many PW's having information of intelligence value are evacuated through medical channels.

(b) EVALUATION: During the reporting period, there were at least 8 PW's of interest to the division who were evacuated through medical channels.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: In order to insure that no intelligence of value is lost, the following should be accomplished:

(1) Tag WIA PW's in same manner as other PW's.

(2) Units should submit spot reports on WIA PW's through normal channels.

(3) Medical facilities should notify nearest IPW element immediately upon receipt of a WIA PW.

(4) Limitation of AN/PFS-4 Radar

(a) OBSERVATION: The AN/PFS-4 Radar cannot provide full coverage in rainy weather.

(b) EVALUATION: The AN/PFS-4 Radar does not give satisfactory results when employed in the rain.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That efforts be made to obtain AN/PFS-5 Radar to replace the AN/PFS-4.

(5) Incomplete Capture Data on IPW's.

(a) OBSERVATION: Prisoners of war are frequently improperly documented.

(b) EVALUATION: In order to insure timely and accurate interrogation of detainees, it is necessary to provide the interrogator with as much information about the detainee and circumstances of capture as possible.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Detainees should be evacuated to Div IV with complete capture data and any documents and weapons in their possession at time of capture. Capturing unit should tag each detainee using MACV form 365 (Detainee Card) or a facsimile thereof. Information should include: DTG of capture, location of capturing unit, circumstance of capture, name and any weapons or documents found on detainee. If at all possible, documents and weapons should be evacuated with the detainee. Division PW Cage has received many detainees during this reporting period with incomplete or no capture data.

(6) Falsified Documentation by the NVA/VC

(a) OBSERVATION: The NVA and VC have been falsifying GVN official documents, such as identity cards.

(b) EVALUATION: Information developed during the recent TET offensive reveals that the NVA/VC have been most successful in duplicating official GVN documentation such as identity cards. To date, there has been no report of US documentation being falsified. However, the NVA/VC have the apparent capability.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: Commanders should be alert to report any incidents of suspected falsification. Reports should include samples of the suspected documentation and all suspects should be retained until the documentation is verified.

7) Reaction to LRP Team contacts.

(a) OBSERVATION: Findings of LRP Teams are often not exploited.

(b) EVALUATION: Recently a LRP Team made contact with an estimated two NVA squads. The supported unit was unable to react to the contact and consequently the 1/9 Cav immediately extracted the team and two NVA.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: As future situations similar to this may be expected to arise, it is recommended that the supported unit react by air lifting a platoon and one empty slick to orbit near area of contact. Thus airborne, the commanders can make an immediate evaluation of the situation and if warranted drop the platoon in to reinforce the team in contact and develop the situation.

(8) Rapid Evacuation of PW's to Division Collection Point.

(a) OBSERVATION: Prisoners must be evacuated to intelligence agencies as rapidly as possible.

(b) EVALUATION: PW's must be evacuated as soon as feasible to the Division Collection Point to allow for detailed interrogation. Capturing units and subordinate headquarters should exploit the PW's for immediate information of tactical value and expedite evacuation of the PW's to Division IFW.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Failure to rapidly evacuate PW's causes unnecessary inquiries from higher HQs and denies the Div HQ valuable timely intelligence information. Therefore, a procedure that provides for rapid evacuation must be established.

E. Logistics

(1) Pre-stock of supplies prior to operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Combat operations can be facilitated by pre-stockage of supplies for major operations.

(b) EVALUATION: Prior to the initiation of Operation PEGASUS a 3 day stockage objective of all classes of supplies was pre-positioned at LZ Stud. This pre-stockage enabled the operation to commence without logistic difficulties. However, the Division was required to use organic resources to establish a significant amount of this pre-positioning because of the lack of FSA support. This resulted in utilization of organic resources and manpower which would have otherwise been used for internal preparation of units and equipment for entry into the operation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Whenever possible supplies should be pre-stocked at a forward supply base prior to the initiation of operations in a new area. The FSA support agency should perform the pre-stockage mission with organic resources thus permitting the division to prepare its resources for entry into the operation.

(2) FSA support.

(a) OBSERVATION: FSA support must be provided in each forward operational areas.

(b) EVALUATION: On Operation DELAWARE an FSA was requested to support the two brigades and the ARVN Regiment operating in the A Shau Valley. This request was not granted by 1st Log Cmd; the only support provided was augmentation for the FSE. This arrangement was unsatisfactory.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Whenever a brigade or larger size element of the division operates in a new area an FSA must be provided to supply wholesale delivery of Class I, III, and V.

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(3) Clearance of drop zones.

(a) OBSERVATION: Drop zones must be cleared of heavy vegetation prior to use.

(b) EVALUATION: On Operation DELAWARE supplies were air dropped on a drop zone which was overgrown with elephant grass and underbrush. As a result bundles were extremely difficult and sometimes impossible to recover. Many were lost and never recovered.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Prior to using such an area for a drop zone it should be cleared by burning if possible.

(4) Limiting stockage.

(a) OBSERVATION: Supply stockage must be monitored and controlled according to plan.

(b) EVALUATION: On Operation DELAWARE a large stockage of supplies, particularly Class V, was built up. When the order came to begin extraction, a massive effort was required to back-haul this stockage.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: In all operations, but particularly one which are of limited duration in remote areas, the supply stocks must be closely monitored and controlled so that excessive stockages do not occur which could cause problems in tactical redeployment.

F. Organization

(1) Crew Member's Individual Weapon

(a) OBSERVATION: The .38 caliber pistol is considered unsatisfactory for aircraft crew members.

(b) EVALUATION: Recent operations in the ICTZ have shown that when confronted by a well equipped and supplied enemy, a downed crew may have to defend themselves for an extended period prior to extraction. Most crew members have requested and carry shot guns, M-16 rifles, and assorted surplus weapons. The unit TO&E's do not allow for the issuance of more than one weapon to an individual. If an aircraft is forced down, the requirement for greater range and firepower exists.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the CAR 15 or M-16 be the TOE individual weapon.

(2) Authority for Fourth Line Company

(a) OBSERVATION: The recognition by Combat Development Command of an urgent need for a fourth line company in the 8th Engineer Battalion emphasizes the requirement for an immediate operation change.

(b) EVALUATION: In the early stages of operations in the JEB STUART I AO, there were no additional engineer units available on a general support basis for the division. Consequently, general support was obtained by removing some of the direct support available to each committed brigade. A similar situation occurred in Operation PEGASUS and is being experienced now in Operation DELAWARE. The battalion cannot deliver the effective direct support needed on a continuing basis by the brigades without a general support capability. The fourth line company would solve this problem.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That TOE 5-215T be immediately revised to reflect the necessary changes.

(3) Firebase Sets

(a) OBSERVATION: Operations PEGASUS and DELAWARE established requirements for the airmobile engineer equipment necessary to open new landing zones and fire bases.

(b) EVALUATION: A fire base set of engineer equipment is comprised of an airmobile dozer (12,000-16000 lbs) and a backhoe, model 3414. These two pieces of equipment have proven to be essential in the developing of fire bases in the tactical areas of operations. Since the committed brigade

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usually open at least two fire bases, a requirement exists to increase the equipment authorization for these two items.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That TOE 5-215T be immediately revised to reflect an increase in 3414 to size authorized to enable each line company to employ two each on a continuing basis. That the number of authorized dozers be delivered to the unit, i.e. six are authorized and only two are on hand.

#### G. Miscellaneous

##### (1) 02B Tape Missions (Psyops)

(a) OBSERVATION: Many 9th ACS 02B tape missions were cancelled due to artillery fire.

(b) EVALUATION: On many occasions, after the 02B aircraft arrived at the Brigade AO, the pilot was denied entry into the AO to broadcast over target area. Many of the missions were cancelled after clearance into the AO was continually denied.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The tactical situation permitting, every effort must be made by fire support coordinators to clear psyops aircraft into the AO.

##### (2) Use of Military Police Personnel

(a) OBSERVATION: When a division deploys, there is an increased need for military police personnel.

(b) EVALUATION: When the 1st Air Cavalry Division assumed its mission in the JEB STUART I AO, it undertook the security of Highway 1 and Sky King Avenue. Since these were the major supply routes within the JEB STUART I AO and were also important links in the supply system of I Corps, a major effort had to be mounted by the division to insure the safe and orderly flow of traffic along these roadways. In order to move traffic in an orderly manner on these restricted roads, a disproportionate amount of the division's military police resources had to be committed to the task. In order to alleviate this drain on men and equipment, augmentation of additional military police was requested from the 18th Military Police Brigade through the USARV Provost Marshal. Although initially approved, the augmentation was later diverted to support the forming of the Provisional Corps Vietnam.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When divisions are deployed to areas that require military police to assume roles beyond those for which they are designed, attachment of the required additional military police should be furnished upon deployment. If this is accomplished, the additional personnel are capable of receiving full logistical support from the division from the outset. Likewise, the division is capable of successfully performing the mission required.

##### (3) Location for Polygraph Examinations

(a) OBSERVATION: A requirement exists for convenient access to polygraph facilities.

(b) EVALUATION: During the conduct of certain Reports of Investigation, the polygraph is utilized. It is a valuable tool when properly utilized by investigator personnel. Trained operators of this instrument are located at the Long Binh Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Group (Provisional), 18th Military Police Brigade. These qualified examiners conduct the polygraph examination upon approval of the Provost Marshal, USARV. These polygraph examiners will not conduct the examination in the field or in an area that is mutually convenient to both parties. In the case of the 1st Cavalry Division, it would be advantageous to be able to conduct such examinations in Da Nang; instead of having both the

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investigator and the subject travel to Long Binh and return. Adequate facilities exist in convenient locations throughout Vietnam and the equipment is designed in order that it may be carried to such areas.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The Criminal Investigation Group adopt the policy of conducting polygraph examinations in mutually convenient locations. It is recognized that careful site selection should be employed but adequate facilities appear to exist in many of the Criminal Investigation Detachments.


(4) Maintenance of Control by Military Police During Base Development

(a) OBSERVATION: Military Police assistance is often required early in base development.

(b) EVALUATION: The development of a base facility that will encompass a command post, airhead and supply element requires the early employment of military police in order to establish and then maintain control throughout the complex as it expands. Traffic regulation at such a complex becomes a matter of concern as the supply facilities expand and an increasing volume of trucks have to be positioned, off-loaded as rapidly as possible, and then dispatched for the return trip that same day to the supply points. Military police are required during this stage to establish and then maintain control throughout the area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That military police be programmed to arrive at the site of proposed command posts in sufficient time to develop and then implement effective traffic and personnel controls. By being included among the first elements to arrive, a logically developed plan can be implemented and then enforced.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
CONRAD L. STANSBERRY  
COL, GS  
Chief of Staff

30 Incl

\* ~~TAB A: The Battle of Quang Tri~~  
\*\* ~~TAB B: Combat Operations After~~  
~~Action Report Operation~~  
~~PERSHING II~~

\*\*\* ~~TAB C: The Battle of Hue~~

TAB D: Task Organization

TAB E: Weather and Terrain

TAB F: Enemy Activity

TAB G: Aerial Surveillance

TAB H: Intelligence Support Units

TAB I: Summary of G-1 Activities

TAB J: Strength Report

TAB K: Casualty Report

TAB L: Replacement Report

TAB M: Units in the 1st Air Cav Div

\*\*\*\* ~~TAB N: Key Personnel Roster~~

TAB O: Extensions/Reenlistment, Promotions

TAB P: Awards and Decorations

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

TAB Q: Special Services Activities

TAB R: Postal Operations

TAB S: AFR

TAB T: Finance Service

TAB U: Medical Activities

TAB V: Religious Activities

\*\*\*\* ~~TAB W: VIP Visits~~

TAB X: Information Activities

TAB Y: Courts-Martial/Article 15

TAB Z: Military Police Activities

TAB AA: G-4 Operations

TAB BB: Logistics

TAB CC: Psychological Operations

TAB DD: Civil Affairs

\* Withdrawn, Hq, DA; published separately as CAAR 68X050

\*\* Withdrawn, Hq, DA; published separately as CAAR 68X051

\*\*\* Withdrawn, Hq, DA; published separately as CAAR 68X052

\*\*\*\* Withdrawn, Hq, DA

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27 AVII-GCT (13 Jun 68)

1st Ind

MAJ Sanderson/dpw/2506  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

DA, HQ, PCV, APO San Francisco 96308 10 JUL 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

1. (U) The inclosed GRL, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), is forwarded IAW USARV Reg 525-15.

2. (C) Comments on Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities, are listed below

a. Item: Page 3, para 1D. Due to the general nature of the statement, it cannot be determined what specific supply shortages existed or the reasons therefore. However, temporary shortages of Class II and Class IV supplies existed during the Battle of Hue City.

b. Item: Page 7, para 1M(2)(B)(4). The main difficulty encountered was one of interface of teletype circuits on US Army Tactical VHF-Carrier Systems with URG AN/TRC-97 tropospheric scatter systems. The problem was resolved when more experienced personnel were committed to assist in establishing the circuits. The experience gained will be valuable in precluding similar difficulties during future joint communications operations.

3. (C) Comments on Section II, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluation and Recommendations, are listed below.

a. Item: Use of CS chemical agent, page 14, para B(1). Concur.

b. Item: Enemy mortar and rocket firing, page 14, para B(2). Concur.

c. Items: Armor seats in LOH, page 14, para B(3). Concur with recommendation. The reporting unit should submit an equipment improvement recommendation (EIR) IAW para 3-7.4, TM 38-750.

d. Item: Recovery aircraft, page 14, para B(4). Concur when feasible. Crew recovery must be made as the mission permits. Mission requirements have priority over either aircraft or crew recovery. Many cases may arise where assets will not permit use of two or more aircraft for recovery. Thus, a hard and fast rule cannot be applied to the number of aircraft assigned to this type mission.

e. Item: Supporting fires for log aircraft, page 14, para B(5). Concur. This procedure is discussed in Chapter 3, Section IV of 1st Avn Bde Operations Manual.

f. Item: CH-54 operations, page 15, para B(6). Concur. Single point suspension loads are not recommended for IFR operations.

g. Item: Dual aircraft for log missions, page 15, para B(7). Concur when feasible. Aircraft availability permitting, the use of dual aircraft greatly improves the flight following and is considered a crew morale factor of great importance.

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- h. Item: Medevac at night in poor weather, page 15, para E(8). Concur in principle. In a valid emergency all possible means of illumination may be used. However, each case will differ because of terrain, capability of the artillery, the threat along the route of flight and the proficiency of flight crews. This does not appear to be a flight technique applicable to a variety of circumstances. Because of the hazards of disorientation and inadvertent instrument flight, such missions should be performed only by instrument rated crews with proficiency in night flying.
- i. Item: Mine sweep procedures, page 15, para E(9). Concur. Daily mine sweeps should alter their methods by sweeping from alternate directions and at varying times. Also, mine sweep personnel should sweep the same area daily; this allows detection of minute changes in terrain.
- j. Item: Command detonated mines, page 15, para E(10). Concur.
- k. Item: Spot mine sweeps, page 16, para E(11). Concur. Spot mine sweeping operations will be performed by engineer personnel only after dismounting from their vehicle.
- l. Item: Hasty repair of runway softspots, page 15, para E(12). Concur.
- m. Item: Sling out for engineer equipment, page 16, para C. Concur.
- n. Item: Overt liaison contact, page 16, para D(1). Concur.
- o. Item: Translations by A/VII interpreters, page 16, para D(2). Concur in principle. The practice of translating each document twice is a waste of time and assets. A spot check could be performed occasionally and serve the same purpose.
- p. Item: Processing wounded prisoners, page 17, para D(3). Concur.
- q. Item: Limitation of AV/PPS-4 radar, page 17, para D(4). Concur. The AV/PPS-5 radar is coming into the inventory. Responsibility for requisition is incumbent upon the unit authorized this equipment by TOE.
- r. Item: Incomplete capture data on IPW's, page 17, para D(5). Concur.
- s. Item: Falsified documentation by the VC/IVA, page 17, para D(6). Concur. Commanders should be advised by their intelligence officer as to the importance of this information being reported.
- t. Item: Reaction to LRP team contacts, page 18, para D(7). Concur. Rapid reaction to significant LRP team contacts will increase the value of the information received.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

- u. Item: Rapid evacuation of PW's to division collection point, page 18, para D(8). Concur.
- v. Item: Prestock of supplies prior to operations, page 18, para E(1). Concur.
- w. Item: FSA support, page 18, para E(2). Nonconcur. The support furnished for Operation DELAMARE included both FSA (wholesale) support by Task Force Lanrley and augmentation for the Forward Support Element (FSE). Wholesale supply support forward is dependent upon establishment and security of lines of communications. These conditions were not sufficiently established to permit another forward FSA to contribute to the mission of Operation DELAMARE.
- x. Item: Clearance of drop zones, page 19, para E(3). Concur.
- y. Item: Limiting stockage, page 19, para E(4). Concur. Such controls are most effectively exercised by FSE's and provide savings in supply expenditures and manpower, and provide for timely movement of priority supplies with reduced expenditures of transportation assets.
- z. Item: Crew member's individual weapons, page 19, para F(1). Concur. This change can be requested by MTOE submission.
- aa. Item: Authority for fourth line company, page 19, para F(2). Concur. This change can be requested by MTOE submission.
- ab. Item: Firebase sets, page 19, para F(3). Concur. This change can be requested by MTOE submission.
- ac. Item: Q2B tape missions, page 20, para G(1). Concur.
- ad. Item: Use of military police personnel, page 20, para G(2). Concur. In the initial deployment of a division to an area that does not have area military police, additional military policemen should be attached to the division to aid in handling missions beyond the division's capability. Once area support has been established these military police should be returned to their parent units. This procedure was followed with the 1st Cav Div (MC), but only after they had been in the new location several weeks.
- ae. Item: Location for polygraph examinations, page 20, para G(3). Nonconcur. The frequency of use by the divisions of the polygraph and the requirements of a suitable location for administering the examinations (air conditioning, sound proofing, steady current and good lighting) do not warrant the establishment of temporary testing locations. The centralization of polygraph equipment and personnel at Long Binh allows for its most efficient use.
- af. Item: Maintenance of control by military police during base development, page 21, para G(4). Concur.

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4. (U) Comment on Operation PARSIFAL II, Tab F, page 13, para 12b(2), concerning resupply of non-TOE Class II and IV. Such resupply is the result of timely demands based on anticipated expenditures.

5. (U) Correction to G4 operation, Tab A1, para 3, line 13. Change 25th General Support to 26th General Support Group.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
R. L. MURDIN  
MAJ, AGC  
Asst AG

Cy furn:

DA, ACSRCR  
CG, 1st Cav Div

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AVHGC-DST (13 Jun 68) 2d Ind (U)

CPT Arnold/dls/LBN 4485

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco, 96375 15 JUL 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division.

2. Concur with report as submitted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*C. S. Nakatsukasa*  
C. S. NAKATSUKASA  
Captain, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
HQ PC/  
HQ 1st Cav Div

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GROP-DT (13 Jun 68) 3d Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Air Cav Div for Period Ending  
30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 1 AUG 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-  
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
C.L. SHORTT  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1948  
 TAB D: Task Organization

1. On 1 February the assignment of maneuver Bn's in the 1 ACD was as follows:

- A. 1st Bde
  - 1-12 Cav
  - 1-8 Cav
  - 1-5 Cav
  - 1-502 Abn
- B. 2d Bde 101 Abn
  - 1-501 Abn
  - 2-501 Abn
- C. 3d Bde
  - 2-12 Cav
  - 1-7 Cav
  - 5-7 Cav

2. On 17 February, the 1st Bn, 3d Marine Regt placed OPCON to the 1st Bde.

3. On 22 February, 2-7 Cav which had been OPCON to the 2d Bde in the Pershing II AC, AL to Quang Tri, A/F and became OPCON to the 1st ACD in the Jeb Stuart AO.

4. On 29 February, the 1st Bn, 3d Marine Regt, was released OPCON 1st Bde placed OPCON 3d Marine Regt.

5. 2 March:

A. 1st Bde, 2d Bde arrived Camp Evans; placed OPCON 1 ACD.

B. 1-501 Abn and 2-501 Cav released OPCON 2d 101; placed OPCON 2d

Bde 1 ACD.

C. 1-501 Abn released OPCON 1st Bde and 2d Bde 101 Abn respectively; placed OPCON 1st Bde.

D. 2-12 Cav and 1-7 Cav released OPCON 3d Bde; placed OPCON Division.

6. 2 March:

A. 2-8 Cav (-) arrived JEB STUART AO; placed OPCON 1st Bde.

B. 1-5 Cav released OPCON 1st Bde; placed OPCON 2d Bde.

C. 2-501 Abn and 1-502 Abn released OPCON 3d Bde; placed OPCON 2d Bde 101 Abn.

D. 1-501 Abn released OPCON 2d Bde 1 ACD; placed OPCON 2d Bde 101 Abn.

E. 2-7 Cav and 2-12 Cav released OPCON Division; placed OPCON 3d Bde.

7. On 7 March, the 1st Bde 101 Abn (1-327 Abn, 2-327 Abn, 2-502 Abn) placed OPCON 1 ACD.

8. 10 March:

A. 1 ACD released OPCON III MAF; placed OPCON Provisional Corps Vietnam.

B. 2d Bde, 101 Abn released OPCON 1 ACD; placed OPCON 101st Abn Div.

9. On 14 March, 2-12 Cav released OPCON 3d Bde; placed OPCON 2d Bde.

10. On 18 March, 1st Bde 101 Abn released OPCON 1 ACD; placed OPCON 101 Abn Division.

11. On 20 March, 3d Flt A Trp 3-5 Armored Cav released OPCON 1 ACD; placed OPCON 101 Abn Div.

12. On 26 March, 2-1 Marines placed OPCON 1 ACD.

13. 29 March:

A. 1st Marine Regt with 2-3 Marine battalion placed OPCON 1 ACD.

B. 2-1 Marines released OPCON 1 ACD; placed OPCON 1st Marine Regt.

14. On 30 March, 1-1 Marine Bn placed OPCON 1 Mar Regt.

15. On 31 March, 26 Marine Regt placed OPCON 1 ACD.

16. On 31 March the Task Organization (maneuver battalions) of the 1 ACD were as follows:

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
TAB D: Task Organization (Cont)

- A. 1st Bde
  - 1-8 Cav
  - 2-8 Cav
  - 1-12 Cav
- B. 2d Bde
  - 1-5 Cav
  - 2-5 Cav
  - 2-12 Cav
- C. 3d Bde
  - 1-7 Cav
  - 2-7 Cav
  - 5-7 Cav
- D. 1st Marine Regt
  - 1-1 Mar
  - 2-1 Mar
  - 2-3 Mar
- E. 26th Marine Regt
  - 1-26 Mar
  - 2-26 Mar
  - 3-26 Mar
  - 1-9 Mar

17. On 7 April, the 3d ARVN ABN TF entered the PEGASUS/LAM SON 207A area of operations and initiated joint operations in coordination and cooperation with 1 ACD.

18. 11 April:

- A. 1-12 Cav released OPCON 1st Bde, 1 ACD; placed OPCON 2d Bde 1 ACD.
- B. 2-12 Cav released OPCON 2d Bde 1 ACD; placed OPCON 2d Bde 101 Abn.

19. On 14 April, 2-12 Cav released OPCON 2d Bde 101 Abn; placed OPCON 3d Bde 1 ACD.

20. 15 April:

- A. The 26th Mar Regt, 1st Mar Regt and 2d Bde (-)(1-5 Cav, 2-5 Cav), 1 ACD released OPCON 1 ACD; placed OPCON 3d Mar Div.

B. 3d ARVN ABN TF terminated operations in PEGASUS/LAM SON 207A area of operations.

21. 18 April:

- A. 2-12 Cav released OPCON 3d Bde; placed OPCON 1 ACD.
- B. 4-31 Inf placed OPCON 1 ACD.

22. 20 April

- A. 196th Light Inf Bde with 2-2 Inf and 3-21 Inf Bn's placed OPCON 1 ACD.

B. 4-31 Inf released OPCON 1 ACD; placed OPCON 196th Lt Inf Bde.

23. On 29 April, 3d ARVN Regt with 1-3 Bn, 2-3 Bn and 2-1 Bn joined the 1 ACD to conduct joint operations in the A Shau Valley.

24. On 30 April the assignment of maneuver Bn's of the 1 ACD was as follows:

- A. 1st Bde
  - 1-8 Cav
  - 2-8 Cav
  - 1-12 Cav
- B. 3d Bde
  - 1-7 Cav
  - 2-7 Cav
  - 5-7 Cav

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
TAB D: Task Organization (Cont)

C. 196th Lt Inf Bde

2-1 Inf  
3-21 Inf  
4-31 Inf

D. 3d ARVN Regt\*

1-3 ARVN  
2-3 ARVN  
2-1 ARVN

E. 1 ACD Control

2-12 Cav

\* Conducting joint operations in cooperation and coordination with 1 ACD

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
 TAB E: Weather and Terrain

1. JEB STUART I (Feb-Mar). Crachin weather resulting from a moderately strong northeast monsoon affected the JEB STUART AO from 1 Feb to 27 Feb. Some clearing was evidenced on the last two days of the month, although moderate early morning fog was present on those two days also.

Significant effects of the crachin were: ceilings were less than 1500 feet greater than 50% of the time (much of this was less than 500 ft); visibility less than or equal to 3 miles about 60% of the time, and less than 5 miles 85% of the time; measurable precipitation fell on 25 days with a trace recorded on one other; temperatures were 10 degrees below expected maximums but were within one or two degrees of expected minimums; relative humidity remained at its annual high (90-100%).

The previous record, to our knowledge, for persistence of crachin weather was 22 consecutive days. This occurred along the Red River Delta, which is the area of maximum crachin activity, statistically. Although only 2.49 inches of precipitation accumulated during the month almost no evaporation took place due to heavy cloud cover and high relative humidity. Additionally, the daily range of temperatures was only 5-7 degrees when 10-15 degree range was expected. Relating this abnormal crachin weather to the global weather picture it appears, from data available, that the month of February was more severe than average in many parts of the northern hemisphere. This seems especially true on the east coasts of the continent. Since crachin weather and its initiator, the northeast monsoon, have their origins in the continental air mass of east Asia, any departures from within this air mass reflected in the local day-to-day weather in areas down stream from the source region. This seems to be a case much in evidence throughout the JEB STUART AO in the month of February.

During the first two weeks of March, moderate on-shore flow brought low stratus and fog conditions throughout the JEB STUART AO. Ceilings were 500' at night but generally raised to 1500' to 2000' during daylight hours. Visibilities were poor at night and in the morning (1-2 miles), and increased to 4-5 miles in haze during the day. The latter part of the month was characterized by southerly flow during which overall conditions improved. Occasional occurrences of stratus still brought ceilings of 700'-1,000', and ground fog was common but daylight ceilings averaged 3000'. Haze continued to limit visibility to 5-6 miles. The extreme and mean temperatures were: Max 94/87; Min 62/70. Rain fell on 12 days with accumulation of 2.21 inches. Average relative humidity was 87%.

2. PEGASUS, JEB STUART II, DELAWARE (April). Operation PEGASUS and Operation JEB STUART II were relatively unaffected by weather. Fog and low stratus limited operational hours to the period 0800-2000 hours on many days. However, during these hours ceilings of 2000' or better and visibility of 5 miles or greater were predominant. Showers fell on 6 days but the accumulation did not significantly affect operations.

Operation Delaware was adversely affected by a late-season frontal passage on D+2. Accompanying the passage were very low ceilings, fog, and intermittent drizzle and showers. These conditions persisted for four days. As the frontal system dissipated conditions improved somewhat with daytime ceilings 2000' to 3000'. Even these ceilings tended to partially obscure some of the higher peaks. Night time fog and low stratus persisted through month's end. Precipitation accumulation was not a significant factor.

Maximum temperatures for April: Extreme 98, mean 88; minimum temperatures for the month: extreme 62, mean 73. Rainfall: Coast 2.67 inches; mountains 3.53 inches. Mean Relative Humidity 87%.

TAB E

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
TAB F: Enemy Activity

1. JEB STUART I (Feb-Mar). Prior to launching the TET Offensive, the 812th Regt, 324B NVA Division moved from the west to Quang Binh (P) NVN on 3 December to Base Area 101 to participate in the attack on Quang Tri City. Other participants already in the Quang Tri area were the 814th Bn, 5th NVA Regt, and the 10th Sapper Bn. The 6th Regt was operating from Base Area 114 in the vicinity of Hue. The newly formed 4th Regt operated in the Phu Loc area. The 12th Sapper Bn and the Hue City Sapper Bn operated to the west of Hue City under the control of Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region HQ. The 910th LP Bn was operating South and West of Hue.

The unsuccessful attack of Quang Tri City was launched at 0700 hrs 31 January. The principle reasons for its failure were poor coordination, lack of reconnaissance, and underestimation of the 1st ACD's capabilities. Approximately 700 were killed. After the attack part of the 912th Regiment moved to the Thac Ma River area South and East of Hai Lang. Other elements returned to Base Area 101.

The enemy attack on Hue City achieved surprise and was successful in seizing a major portion of the city. As pressure from allied elements increased the enemy was forced back along the western wall. The 416th Bn, 5th Regt, which had moved from the Hai Lang Forest, arrived in Hue to reinforce on 17 February. It passed south of Khe Sanh, through the Ba Long Valley, through Base Area 101 and 114, through the La Chu area and arrived at Hue on 22 and 23 February. The 7th Bn entered the city on 22 Feb. Elements of the 8th Bn entered on the following day. The 29th Regt, 325C NVA Div, had also moved from the Khe Sanh area to reinforce enemy elements of Hue. The pressure exerted from the west of Hue initiated on 21 Feb by the 1st ACD, dispelled any enemy hope of permanently holding Hue. On 25 Feb enemy elements vacated the city with the 6th Regt, 50th Regt (-) and 29th Regt (-) moving to the west and southwest of Hue and the 4th Regt moving south to the Nam Hoa area was controlled by the Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ which was located southwest of the city. Enemy losses in the battle are presently carried at over 5000 enemy killed.

Since the battle of Hue City elements of 403d Regt, 324th NVA Div have moved east along the coast from the Cua Viet area to a position north and northwest of Hue. The 48th and 52d Regt's of the 320th NVA Div have moved from the Cam Lo area toward Cua Viet. Within the JEB STUART AO, the enemy has been concerned with the evacuation of the Hue area and protecting supply routes along the Thach Ma and Song Bo Rivers for supply of Base Area 101 and 114 (southeast) respectively. Enemy construction on route 547 from A Shau Valley to Hue City and indications of large movements of fresh units and replacements show the determination of the enemy to attempt new large scale attacks in the Quang Tri-Hue Area.

KIA-NVA/VC 1,543/150; CAPTURED-NVA/CS 32/9; WEAPONS-SL/CS 351/106

During the first 2 weeks of March the enemy continued to reorganize, reinforce, and resupply in preparation for a renewed offensive. Operations against allied units initially appeared to be harassment in nature, characterized by stand off attacks by rocket and/or mortar fire, interdiction of communications routes, and extensive use of mines and booby traps in areas critical to friendly supply activities. The enemy increased his activity in the A Shau Valley and along Route 547 to establish a large logistical base and a secure communications route west of Hue. The numerous rocket positions oriented toward US and allied installations, and a decrease in normal activity indicate the imminence of a renewed offensive.

TAB F

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
 TAB F: Enemy Activity (Cont)

In addition to normal supply and security movements the enemy began repositioning units in preparation for renewed offensive action. The 81st Bn, 5th Regt moved from Base Area 101 to the coastal plains area northeast of Hai Lang and Quang Tri City, and conducted population control operations in preparation for the attack on Quang Tri City. The 2d Bn, 803d Regt moved southeast from the Quang Tri City area and joined the remainder of the 803d Regiment in the vicinity of Hue. This move was accomplished in less than 36 hours.

During the last two weeks of March the Allies launched aggressive attacks against known and suspected enemy concentrations, with the 1st ACD attacking into Base Area 101 and Base Area 114, the 101st Abn Div attacking northwest of Hue and southwest of the city along Hwy 547, and 1st ARVN Division attacking west, north, and south of Hue and west into the staging area north of Hwy 547. ARC Lights, Air Strikes and Naval Gunfire were employed against known enemy concentrations. The Allies quickly gained the initiative, disorganized the enemy, and forced the enemy to abandon his plans for an offensive, at least temporarily.

KIA-NVA/VC 852/207; CAPTURED-NVA/VC 36/42; WEAPONS-SA/CS 275/37

2. PEGASUS, JEB STUART II, DELAWARE (April). During the reporting period, the First Team completed two operations and continues in a third. The first fifteen days of April, during Operation Pegasus/Lam Son 207A, the enemy continued withdrawing from the Khe Sanh area, with large segments of his estimated 16 battalion force moving to the west into Laos. Operations against allied forces consisted primarily of delaying tactics for the first week, degenerating into full-scale retreat from the vast firepower of the airmobile forces. The enemy was forced to abandon large amounts of equipment, weapons and ammunition in order to salvage his waning troop strength, seriously depleted by incessant B-52 strikes immediately prior to, and during the early phases of the operation. The enemy offered little or no resistance to allied efforts to open Highway 9; those contacts that materialized were penetrated out of desperation upon being trapped by the highly mobile allies. In the later phases of the operation the enemy reacted primarily with standoff rocket and artillery attacks, many from the sanctuary of Laos. The new special forces camp to the west of Lang Vei was stubbornly defended by an estimated battalion, as was the prominent terrain features of Hills 881 North and 471. The enemy took full advantage of holding high ground to delay allied advances to the Laotian border.

Operation JEB STUART II brought the First Team back to the coastal plains to bolster security for the 1st Air Cavalry Division base areas. The enemy conducted reconnaissance and resupply missions in preparation for a second offensive against Quang Tri and Hue City. High level coordination meetings were disclosed through numerous agent reports and many Prepared rocket launching sites appeared completely encircling Camp Evans. Simultaneously, the enemy continued their efforts at opening a main supply route from the A Shau Valley to the mountainous area west of Hue City.

The last eleven days of the month of April, the enemy increased his repositioning activity considerably, moving large forces into Base Areas 101 and 114, as well as gathering supplies to support a planned offensive. The A Shau Valley became an area of deep concern to the enemy as the allied forces air assaulted into the long-time logistical complex and base area. The enemy had provided an excellent air defense capability for the valley with at least two battalions of anti-aircraft guns, ranging in size from 12.7mm through

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
TAB F: Enemy Activity (Cont)

37mm. Their cache locations were defended in a semi-balanced condition with weighted area coverage, concentrated on forced avenue of approach. The enemy took full advantage of adverse weather conditions by exercising strict fire disciplines: firing at all high flying and larger aircraft, regardless of altitude, with all air defense weapons available.

At the end of the reporting period, the enemy offered only token resistance in the A Shau Valley, seemingly being content with occupying the highly mobile allies in that area and willingly giving up military stores for the advantage of being able to maneuver large fighting forces into Base Areas 101 and 114, ostensibly for the purpose of initiating another offensive.

OPERATION PEGASUS/LAM SON 207A:

KIA-NVA/VC 1042/2 CAPTURED- NVA/VC 13/0 WEAPONS- SA/CS 473/190

OPERATION JEB STUART II:

KIA-NVA/VC 224/1 CAPTURED- 0/0 WEAPONS- 2/0

OPERATION DELAWARE/LAM SON 216: (Continuing)

KIA-NVA/VC 133/57 CAPTURED- 1/0 WEAPONS- 548/20

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
 TAB G: Aerial Surveillance

1. Mission Statistics for the Period 1 Feb-30 Apr 68.

MISSION TYPE	ASTA SCHED/COMP	III MAF SCHED/COMP	RESULTS
IR	606/63	18/UNK	118 HOTSPOTS
SLAR	211/95	0/0	2209 MOVING TARGETS
PHOTO	237/185	41/23	
PHOTO (HAND HELD)	9/9	0/0	

2. General Comments; Aerial surveillance continued to be severely curtailed by unfavorable weather conditions and the shortage of pilots.

A. IR. During the reporting period the ASTA Platoon was able to complete only 10% of the scheduled missions. A total of 507 missions were cancelled due to weather conditions and 36 cancelled due to aircraft or sensor malfunction. The ASTA Platoon lost one OV-10 aircraft to ground fire on 6 Apr 1968. The aircraft was completely lost. No replacement aircraft has been received to date leaving the ASTA Platoon with 2 remaining OV-10 aircraft.

B. SLAR. The ASTA Platoon continued to support the Market Time operations in conjunction with the US Navy. A total of 211 missions were scheduled and 95 were completed. SLAR Operations were curtailed severely by the loss of one OV-1B aircraft during a rocket attack at Hue-Phu Bai on 24 Mar 68. A replacement OV-1B aircraft was received 21 Apr 68, but was not mission-ready until 27 Apr 68.

C. PHOTO. A total of 237 missions were scheduled during the period of which 52 are still outstanding. A majority of the missions not completed are in the A Shau Valley. A total of 9 hand held missions were conducted by the 3d Brigade in planning their assault into the A Shau. Camouflage detection film was used on 8 missions during the month of Apr and in each case excellent results were obtained. Units desiring camouflage detection missions should submit approximately 4 target areas, assigning each a priority. This will allow the use of a full roll of film.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
TAB H: Intelligence Support Units.

1. Co E, 52d Infantry (LRP). LRP support was provided throughout the reporting period in Operations JEB STUART I & II, PEGASUS and DELAWARE. A total of 66 missions were conducted during the reporting period with a total of 177 sightings of 1 or more NVA/VC. LRP teams continued to provide timely and accurate hard intelligence to the G2. The 1/9 Cav continued to support the LRP's with gunships and infantry platoons, as required.

2. 191st Military Intelligence Detachment. The 191st MID continued to provide Order of Battle, Counterintelligence, Imagery Interpretation and Interrogation of Prisoners of War support to the Division during the reporting period. Liaison was made with existing intelligence gathering agencies as the 191st MID provided timely reports of enemy activity.

IPW and OB provided a continuing evaluation of the enemy's composition, strength, disposition and missions through their analysis of captured documents and the interrogation of PW's. Two complete OB handbooks were disseminated during the reporting period, keeping the commanders and staff's at all levels informed of the rapidly changing enemy situation.

3. Division Radar Platoon (Provisional). The Radar Platoon provided limited support during the reporting period. The 54th Inf Radar Detachment was detached from the 1st ACD when the Division moved to I Corps. The Radar Platoon was formed with equipment and cadre personnel of the 54th Inf with a mission of providing radar support to the 1st ACD as well as training radar operators coming in the replacement stream. The Radar Platoon supported all operations during the reporting period and was deployed in Operation DELAWARE at the close of April.

4. Detachment 31, 5th Weather Sqn (USAF). The USAP continued to provide long range and daily weather forecasts to the 1st ACD. Weather was a critical factor during the reporting period as previously indicated.



SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
 TAB I: Summary of G-1 Activities

1. The period 1 Feb 68 to 30 April 1968 showed an improved operating capability for the agencies and sections under the general staff supervision of the AC of S, G1. All sections/agencies continued to consolidate their activities at Camp Evans to provide better service for the division. A small element consisting of 1 officer and 1 clerk, served as G1 Forward during Operation Pegasus/Lam Son 207A.
2. The operating strength of the division remained at approximately one hundred per cent of authorized. For losses during the period included 2 Battalion Commanders killed and 2 medically evacuated. Serious shortages continued to exist in Infantry and Armor Captains, Signal Officers, Warrant Officer aviators (especially C-47 qualified), Infantry 117's and Artillery 13A & B's. A staff visit to USARV 13 was made to coordinate replacements during the peak summer rotation period and discuss personnel shortages.
3. Staff visits were made to 1st Cavalry soldiers in hospitals throughout Vietnam. Methods were worked out to provide a more expeditious system for re-directing mail.
4. Personnel Services for the division continued to expand and improve.
  - a. A Post Exchange was opened at Camp Evans.
  - b. A laundry operated by Vietnamese Nationals was established at Camp Evans.
  - c. A central barber shop with Local National barbers also opened for business.
  - d. A beer and soda bulk sales outlet was established by the Division Club System.
  - e. A Piaster exchange point was established.
5. The division filled all In and Out-of-Country TR allocations during the period. As of 7 March all In-Country RTR's switched from Vung Tay to China Beach in Da Nang. The weekly allocations at China Beach increased in April from 84 to 110 per week.
6. The Custodian, Central Post Fund, traveled to Japan and negotiated contacts for CFF business to include mementoes to be presented to all members of THE PURVEY TEAM departing Vietnam.
7. A program to reduce the number of officer, NCO and enlisted clubs at Camp Radcliff was initiated. By the end of April all but 1 Officer and 4 NCO/EN clubs had been phased out of operation.
8. In March 118 offenses were processed by the Provost Marshal's office indicating a high degree of discipline, law and order throughout the division. The division continued to strictly enforce the off limits policy for all populated areas except for those personnel conducting official business and tactical operations.
9. Due to contaminated water, there was an outbreak of gastroenteritis involving approximately 50% of the division during the last two weeks of April. Appropriate steps were taken to preclude a recurrence.
10. Morale in the division remained high.

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TAB I

**CONFIDENTIAL**

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
 TAB J: Strength Report

The authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning and close of the reporting period were as follows:

Beginning of Period	OFF	WO	ENL	ATG
AUTH	1294	697	16333	14234
ASGD	1303	560	16273	18136
Close of Period				
AUTH	1370	710	17392	19472
ASGD	1287	606	17288	19181

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TAB J

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
TAB K: Casualty Report

During February, March and April the division sustained the following casualties:

	KIA	WIA	*MIA	NH	CROWN	TOTAL
Officer	33	207	13	6	1	260
Enlisted	278	1755	72	50	12	2167
TOTAL	311	1962	85	56	13	2427

\* Represents personnel who were reported MIA during this period and who remained in MIA status as of the end of the report period.

TAB K

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
T/B L: Replacement Report

The following is a breakout of incoming and outgoing personnel for the period February, March and April.

	<u>Replacements Received</u>	<u>Rotateses</u>
Officers	359	176
Warrant Officers	212	123
Enlisted	<u>6104</u>	<u>2313</u>
Total	4675	3612

TAB L

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
TAB M: List of Units in the 1st Air Cav

1st Bn, 12th Cav  
1st Bn, 8th Cav  
2d Bn, 8th Cav  
1st Bn, 5th Cav  
2d Bn, 5th Cav  
2d Bn, 12th Cav  
1st Bn, 7th Cav  
2d Bn, 7th Cav  
5th Bn, 7th Cav  
1st Sqdn, 9th Cav  
HHC Div Arty  
2d Bn, 20th Arty  
2d Bn, 19th Arty  
1st Bn, 21st Arty  
1st Bn, 77th Arty  
Btry E, 82d Arty  
5th Marine Gun Platoon  
1st Bn, 30th Arty  
HHC, 11th Avn Gp  
11th GS Avn Co  
227th Avn Bn  
228th Avn Bn  
229th Avn Bn  
HHC & Band  
Spt Gnd  
15th Med Bn  
15th S&S Bn  
15th TC Bn  
27th Maint Bn

HHC, 1st Cav Div  
Co E, 52d Inf  
HHC, 1st Bde  
HHC, 2d Bde  
HHC, 3d Bde  
8th Engr Bn  
13th Sig Bn  
15th Admin Co  
545th MP Co  
504th MP Co  
583d MI Det  
41st PI Det  
42d PI Det  
25th Inf Plt (SN)  
34th Inf Plt (SN)  
26th Chem Det  
184th Chem Det  
191st MI Det  
14th Mil Hist Det  
478th Avn Co  
382d Trans  
459th Sig Det  
371st Rad Res Co  
62d Inf Plt  
5th Wea Sqdn  
1st Bn, 50th Inf (Mech)

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TAB M

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

TAB O: Extensions/Reenlistment/Promotions

Feb-Mar-Apr 68

Extensions of Foreign Service Tour:

6 Months	Less Than 6 Months
OFF- 2	OFF- 1
EM- 329	EM- 115

Reenlistments:

<u>Categories</u>	<u>Total Separations</u>	<u>Eligible</u>	<u>Reenl</u>	<u>Pct</u>	<u>Da</u>	<u>Chi</u>
1st Term RA	95	83	35	42.2		33.3
AUS Personnel	236	138	28	20.3		6.7
ER/NG Personnel	1	1	1	100.0		25.0
Career RA	111	104	104	100.0		87.0
Totals	443	326	168	57.5		

Extensions of Enlistment: 38

Enlisted Promotions: 7,198

Enlisted Grade Posture

	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4	E3,2,1	Total
Authorized	42	223	578	1517	3732	5885	5415	17,392
Assigned	42	168	478	1184	4432	6356	4836	17,288
Balance	0	-55	-100	-333	+700	+471	-579	-104

TAB O

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
TAB P: Awards and Decorations

The following is a list of awards that were finalized and orders cut during the period 1 February-30 April 1968.

MH	0
DSC	3
DSM	0
SS	152
LCM	4
DFC	126
SM	12
BS "V"	291
BS	1526
AM "V"	90
AM	6741
ACM "V"	144
ACM	1297
PH	1719

TAB P

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
 TAB Q: Special Service Activities

Allocations for the reporting period that were received and used.

Out-of-Country R&R:

<u>DESTINATION</u>	<u>ALLOCATIONS</u>	<u>USED</u>
Bangkok	660	694
Hawaii	916	921
Tokyo	307	313
Australia	585	597
Hong Kong	549	556
Manila	99	100
Penang	173	175
Taipei	586	594
Kuala Lumpur	146	143
Singapore	212	206
Totals	4233	4299

In-Country R&R

Vung Tau	270	284
China Beach	675	706
Totals	945	990

TAB Q

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
TAB R: Postal Operations

1. Money Order Sales	\$1,037,199.78
2. Postage Meter Sales	\$4,463.20
3. Stamp Stock Sales	\$9,200.00
4. Total Pieces of Incoming Mail	23,324
5. Weight of Incoming Mail	673.7 Tons
6. Total Pieces of Outgoing Mail	7,057
7. Weight of Outgoing Mail	107.5 Tons
8. Average Weight of Incoming Mail	7 Tons
9. Average Weight of Mail Dispatched	1.2 Tons
10. Number of Days Mail Received	89
11. Number of Days Mail Dispatched	90
12. Accountable Mail Received	3,823
13. Accountable Mail Dispatched	3,174
14. Total Pieces of Mail Receiving Directory Service	184,849

TAB R

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
TAB S: Army Emergency Relief (AER)

\$1300 in assistance was given to 6 persons during the Quarter

TAB S

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
TAB T: Finance Services

1. Finance services for the period 1 Feb-30 Apr 68 were as follows:
  - a. Regular monthly payments: 54,311
  - b. Partial and Advance payments: 20,160
  - c. Travel Payments: 5,676
  - d. Piaster Sales: 5,816
  - e. Sales of Government checks: 1,807
  - f. Personnel processed in: 7,057
  - g. Personnel processed out: 4,443
  - h. Total cash and check payments value \$15,538,005.94
2. The Command Savings Program participation on 30 April was:
  - a. Total participation: 89.5%
  - b. Bonds only: 82.5%
  - c. Bonds and Savings Deposits: 4.5%
  - d. Savings Deposits only: 2.5%

TAB T

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
TAB U: Medical Activities

1. Disease and injury statistical data:
  - A. Non-battle injuries 406
  - B. Disease 994
    - (1) Malaria 52
      - (a) Vivax 30
      - (b) Falciparum 22
    - (2) Scrubtyphus 8
    - (3) FUO 300
    - (4) Psychiatric Cases 26
    - (5) Others 708
  - C. Remaining in Hospital (In Country) 1038

2. Discussion of Diseases:

A. Malaria cases: A total of 52 cases of malaria occurred in personnel of this division from 1 February 1968 to 30 April 1968, inclusively. Of these 30 (58%) cases were due to Plasmodium vivax and were caused in most US Forces by failure to take the weekly chloroquine-primaquine pill.

The malaria incidence is as follows:

UNIT	FEB	MAR	APR	TOTAL
HHC 1st Bde	0	1	0	1
1/8	0	2	0	2
2/8	2	0	0	2
1/12	0	2	0	2
HHC 2d Bde	0	0	0	0
1/5	3	0	0	3
2/5	2	2	5	9
2/12	1	0	1	2
HHC 3d Bde	1	0	1	2
1/7	0	4	1	5
2/7	0	0	1	1
5/7	4	2	3	9
Div Arty	1	1	1	3
1/9	0	0	0	0
Avn Gp	0	1	1	2
Spt Cmd	0	0	2	2
Sig Bn	0	0	0	0
Engr Bn	1	0	2	3
HHC Div	0	0	1	1
LRRP	0	2	0	2
15th Admin	0	0	0	0
Other	0	1	0	1
TOTAL	15	18	19	52

B. Other selected diseases of importance are as follows:

Immersion Foot	1
Heat Exhaustion	29
Poisoning	0
Animal Bites	2
Hepatitis	6
Dengue Fever	1
Infectious Meningitis	0
Encephalitis	1
Leptospirosis	1

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TAB U

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
TAB U: Medical Activities

C Diarrhea: An outbreak of gastroenteritis involving approximately 50% of 1st Air Cavalry Division personnel occurred during the last two weeks of April. This was caused by Shigella flexneri spread via contaminated water. Appropriate steps to insure potability of water have been taken, and a program of mass immunization with gamma globulin, as prophylaxis against infectious hepatitis, is under way.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
TAB V: Religious Activities 1 Feb-30 Apr 68

1. A chaplains' meeting was held and the Division AG and IG spoke to the chaplains about personnel actions affecting their sphere of operation.
2. A total of 639 Divine Services with an attendance of 22,572 were conducted throughout the division.
3. Three temporary chapels were constructed in the Div Artv headquarters area, the 1/9th area and Wunder Beach area to provide a suitable place for Divine Services.
4. Chaplains continued to visit the sick and wounded in the various hospitals, with one chaplain making a visit to the hospitals in Japan.
5. Chaplains continue to assist in health and welfare projects in the local communities, including the distribution of large amounts of children's clothing. They also participate in teaching programs for indigenous personnel.
6. The providing of adequate Catholic coverage still requires Catholic Chaplains to cover many units, including non-divisional, other than their own. This necessitates a sympathetic understanding on the part of their commanding officers.

TAB V

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
 TAB I: Information Activities

The Information Office continued to increase its service to the world's press and division troops during the reported period. The following is an analytical breakdown by function.

1. The Information Section operated forward press centers during the following operations:

JEB STUART	22 Jan 68- 31 Mar 68
PEGASUS/LAM 207A	1 Apr 68- 15 Apr 68
DELAWARE	16 Apr 68-continuing

2. The Information Section continued to place emphasis on hometowners both in radio and newspaper form.

<u>HOMETOWNERS</u>	<u>RADIO HOMETOWNERS</u>
1776	276

3. Troop Topics emphasizing 1st Cavalry accomplishments were published each week and command information brochures were distributed on the following subjects:

- a. R&R program Singapore
- b. Branch immaterial logistical information.
- c. The Army Community Service Program.
- d. In Country R&R and Skytrooper Chapter
- e. Passports and reduced air fare for parents.
- f. Military Academy Prep School and History of the 1st Cav Patch.
- g. Did You Know?
- h. The Presidents' Speech and the weeks actions.
- i. Questions and Answers about the 1st Cav.
- j. The 1st Air Cav Unique Division.

4. 236 newsmen visited the 1st Cavalry Division during the period. They represented the following agencies:

ABC	Washington Post	Hearst News
CBS	US News & World Report	Hometown Feature Service
NBC	Contact	Handelf Platt
GRENADA TV	Press	La Nacio (Buenos Aires)
Independent TV	Sunday Times	Le Figaro
AP	Esquire	Corriere Della Sera
UPI	NA Magazine (Oslo)	Diario Popular
KOIN/CBS	Nat'l Geographic	Dagens Nyheter
KGNC-TEXAS	Imperial Press	Vietnam Nouveau
News London	Newsday	Graphic Publications
WIBW-KANSAS	Stars & Stripes	III M-F-IO
REUTERS	N.Y. Times	Overseas Weekly
Newsweek	LA Times	Revista Realidade
Life	London Times	Continental Research
Agency France	Daily Telegraph (London)	Daihan Ilbo (Seoul)
Time	Chicago Daily News	Blick (Switzerland)
US/ARV-IO	Tucson Daily Citizen	INT
Kansas City Star	Empire News	AFP
Detroit News	Daily Republican Eagle	Mutual Broadcasting System
Magnum Photos	DASPD	221st Signal
Free Lance	ORTF (Paris)	France Soir

5. The radio section produced the following news stories, interviews and editorial support, during the quarter.

a. Number of regular taped radio hometown interviews sent to Hometown News Center, Kansas City totaled 169.

TAB X

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
TAB X: Information Activities

b. Continued to produce two newsletters (0600) and (1800) each day totaling 180 newsletters during this quarter. (Newsletters are produced for base camp and forward division command post).

c. Provided AFR-TV Da Nang with a nightly war story by phone, and a weekly packer of news stories, features, command information announcements, and Camp Evans activities.

6. The Photo Section was responsible for taking and developing 8,526 photos and making 9,110 prints from selected negatives.

7. The military press section, in addition to supporting with stories and editing, was responsible for the release of 479 stories and features during this reporting period, many gaining recognition in national papers such as The New York Times, Stars and Stripes, Chicago Tribune, Denver Post, Houston Chronicle, San Francisco, Minneapolis Star, Louisville Courier Journal, and the Miami Herald.

8. The publishing of the Cavalair in Tokyo at Stars and Stripes.

9. The publishing of the first quarterly magazine of the 1st Cav in Tokyo at Di Nippon Publishing Company.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
TAB Y: Courts-Martial/Article 15

The following information is furnished for the period 1 Feb 68-30 Apr 68

Article 15	351
Courts-Martial (total)	59
Summary	9
Special	46
General	4

TAB Y

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
 TAB 2: Military Police Activities

1. During the period 1 Feb-30 Apr 68, the Office of the Provost Marshal, 1st Air Cavalry Division processed a total of 183 offenses that were committed within the 1st Air Cavalry Division's area of responsibility.

a. Offender Statistics:

Category	
Crimes against persons and property	31
Miscellaneous offenses	33
Military offenses	57
Traffic violations	62
TOTAL	183

b. Comments on Offender Statistics:

(1) Crimes against persons and property: Frauds (9) and larcenies (19) accounted for the majority of offenders within this category.

(2) Miscellaneous Offenses: Wrongful possession and/or use of marijuana accounted for 27 offenders.

(3) Military Offenses: This category included 30 off-limits, 9 AWOL, one careless discharge of a firearm, one losing military property through neglect, and one making of a false official document.

(4) Traffic Violations: There were 54 individuals cited as speeding offenders during this reporting period.

2. Detainee Report:

Category	
Returnees	12
VC	49
NVA	65
Civil Defendants	116
Innocent Civilians	739
Total	981

TAB 2

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
TAB AA: G-4 Operations

1. General. During the period 1 Feb-30 Apr 68 combat service support was provided for five major operations: PERSHING, JEB STUART, PEGASUS, JEB STUART II, and DELAWARE.

2. The 2d Brigade remained in Operation PERSHING until 20 Feb and was provided combat service support by the 1st FSE collocated with the bridge at LZ Uplift.

3. Operation JEB STUART which began on 24 Jan continued until 31 March. The Division Support Command established the Logistical Control Center at Phu Bai. During the initial phase of the operation all supply support came from FLSC-A of the III MAF, Force Logistics Command located at Phu Bai. Shortly after the beginning of the operation 1st Log Command formed the Da Nang Support Command which was to assume responsibility for logistical support of all US Army units in ICTZ. During the TET Offensive the LOC from Phu Bai to the division was cut because of the NVA occupation of Hue. To circumvent this, logistic support was shifted from FLSC-A to FLSC-B at Dong Ha and the operation was supported by land LOC from Dong Ha. Because of the shortage of ground transportation it was necessary to supplement the resupply received by land LOC with emergency air drop of ammunition and rations into Camp Evans. In early March, 25th General Support Group, the subordinate element of Da Nang Support Command responsible for support of US Army units in Northern ICTZ, established a Logistical Over the Shore (LOTS) operational site at Wunder Beach and began providing resupply to the elements of the division from this source. By the conclusion of the operation logistic support from Wunder Beach had expanded to a point where most supply requirements were filled by material from this source although some supply was still being furnished by FLSC-A and FLSC-B.

A. The 1st Brigade assumed responsibility for the Northern portion of the AO and established its base at LZ Betty. Combat service support was provided by the 2d FSE with FSA support provided by Task Force Moroz. Resupply was accomplished by land LOC from FLSC-B and Wunder Beach.

B. The 2d Brigade 101st Abn was under the OPCON of the 1st Air Cavalry Division for the first part of the operation and assumed responsibility for the central portion of the AO. The brigade established its base at LZ Jane and was provided combat service support by the 2d FSE with FSE support from Task Force Moroz. Resupply was accomplished by land LOC from FLSC-B and Wunder Beach.

C. The 3d Brigade assumed responsibility for the southern portion of the AO and established its base at Camp Evans. Combat service support was provided by the 3d FSE with FSA support provided by Task Force McDonald collocated with the FSE. Resupply was accomplished by land LOC from FLSC-A, FLSC-B and Wunder Beach.

D. The 2d Brigade did not arrive in the JEB STUART AO until 1 March at which time they relieved the 2d Brigade 101st Abn. of responsibility for the central portion of the AO and established their base at LZ Jane. Combat service support was provided by the 1st FSE with FSA support from Task Force Moroz. Resupply was accomplished by land LOC from FLSC-B and Wunder Beach.

E. The 2d Brigade 101st after being relieved from the central portion of the AO remained OPCON, moved to an area south of the 3d Brigade, and established a base at LZ Sally. Combat service support was provided by the organic FSE and resupply was accomplished by land LOC from Wunder Beach and FLSC-A. Soon after the move to the new area the 2d Bde 101st reverted to control of the 101st Abn.

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TAB AA

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